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ABSTRACT
This study investigated the effects of mortality salience, group membership, partner’s
behavior, and adherence to the norms of positive and negative reciprocity. Three-hundredeighty-four participants completed the either a mortality salience or control (where mortality was
not salient) induction, a group membership induction, a personal norms of reciprocity scale, one
round of a single-shot trust game (a measure of positive reciprocity), and one round of a singleshot ultimatum game (a measure of negative reciprocity). During the trust game, an ostensible
interaction partner received a small monetary endowment, and contributed either that entire
endowment or less than half of it (keeping the rest for him/herself) to a general fund that was
guaranteed to triple in value before being transferred to the participant. The participant’s task
was then to determine how much of the general fund to return to the interaction partner, keeping
the rest for him/herself. In the ultimatum game, the ostensible interaction partner was given a
$20 endowment by the experimenter, he/she either proposed an even $10/$10 split of that
endowment with the participant, or a $12/$8 split (in his/her own favor). The participant’s task
was to decide whether to accept or reject the proposed split. For positive reciprocity, I found a
main effect of adherence to the norm of positive reciprocity, and a main effect of partner’s
behavior that was qualified by a partner’s behavior by mortality salience interaction, such that
when participants were not primed with mortality salience, they returned more of the general
fund when they were paired with a generous partner then when they were paired with a stingy
partner. For negative reciprocity, I found, that their decisions about whether to accept or reject
x

Player 1’s offer were again affected by the partner’s behavior, and the degree to which the
participant adhered to the norm of negative reciprocity.

xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Americans have been progressively trending towards political
polarization (i.e., Democrats and Republicans report feelings of intense animosity toward one
another; Levendusky, 2018; Abramowitz & Webster, 2018), which increases the potential for
conflict on a multitude of levels. When the political polarization between Democrats and
Republican is interpreted as a group phenomenon, the concept of reciprocity stands out as a
factor that is likely to substantially impact both intergroup and intragroup conflict. Reciprocity is
a universal concept that is commonly accepted as a social norm considering that it is something
that people often do and feel obligated to do. Additionally, this social norm is frequently
embedded in our laws, religions, moral codes, and informal social contracts with one another
(Gouldner, 1960). Across disciplines, reciprocity is generally defined as the principal of
conditionally responding to the actions of others in kind (i.e., with behaviors of similar type,
degree, and valence) (Perugini & Gallucci, 2001). Consequently, there is a distinction between
positive reciprocity, the repayment of the beneficial actions and intentions of others, and
negative reciprocity, the retaliation against the detrimental actions and intentions of others.
Given that reciprocation of an early act of kindness has the potential to instigate a mutually
advantageous cycle of benefit and reciprocity (Pillutla, Malhotra, Murnighan, 2003), engaging in
positive reciprocity may be one way to reduce intergroup conflict and to maintain intragroup
harmony. In contrast, engaging in negative reciprocity is likely to begin or continue a mutually
1

destructive, and potentially costly, cycle of revenge and discord that results in further
divisiveness between and within groups. Moreover, research suggests that there are both
situational and personal factors that impact the degree to which the social norm of reciprocity
influences behavior.
One set of circumstances that has been shown to increase adherence to the social norm of
reciprocity is the presence of death-related thoughts (Galliot, Stillman, Schmeichel, Maner, &
Plant, 2008). According to Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon,
1986), one ubiquitous source of underlying anxiety that all humans share is the knowledge that
we will die someday. The way that Terror Management Theory related hypotheses are typically
generated and tested is by way of an experimental manipulation known as mortality salience.
Research using this manipulation suggests that making mortality more salient than it typically is
can subtly influence the way we interact with one another. One consequence of mortality
salience is an increase in adherence to salient norms and values (e.g., reciprocity).
Another known consequence of mortality salience (Burke, Martens, Faucher, 2009) is an
increase in ingroup bias. Research indicates mortality salience increases ingroup bias even in
minimal group contexts (Harmon‐Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996). Findings from
research that uses the Minimal Group Paradigm (Tajfel, Biling, Bundy, Flament, 1971) reveal
that simply being placed into a group increases the likelihood of intergroup discrimination in
favor of the ingroup. This suggests that conditions that commonly occur with real-world groups
(e.g., conflicts of interest, a history of hostility, etc.) are not necessary for intergroup bias to
occur. Mortality salience appears to strengthen this effect, and increases inter-group
divisiveness, with those who are under the influence of mortality salience displaying even more
2
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intergroup bias in favor of the ingroup (Harmon‐Jones et al., 1996). Further, in addition to
giving ingroup members preferential treatment, individuals also expect to receive preferential
treatment from their fellow ingroup members, and they are willing to punish those who do not
provide it (Mendoza, Lane, & Amodio, 2014).
This dissertation examines three different literatures. The first, is literature related to
reciprocity, the second is literature related to Terror Management Theory and the mortality
salience hypothesis, and the third is literature relating to groups. Throughout this dissertation, I
will provide the theoretical rationale for how these three literatures are related to one another. I
will also provide hypotheses that are rooted in the literature throughout the literature review and
I will provide a recap of these hypotheses at the end of the literature review. Further, I will
explain the laboratory experiment that was conducted to test these hypotheses. Finally, I will
provide illustrations and interpretations of the results that were attained.
Literature Review
Reciprocity
It is well known that individuals frequently make the effort to reward beneficial others
and to punish detrimental others, even under conditions of anonymity, at cost to themselves, and
when the likelihood of future interaction is low (Gachter & Herrmann, 2009; Fehr, Fischbacher,
& Gächter, 2002; Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Erocolani, 2003; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Berg,
Dickhaut, McCabe, 1995). Two of the features of reciprocal behavior that distinguish it from
other actions and orientations (e.g., altruism, benevolence, hostility, etc.) are that it is
conditional, and it only occurs in response to the perceived actions and/or intentions of someone
else. As a conditional response (i.e., someone else must take action first in order for
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reciprocation to take place), there is a distinction between circumstances that call for positive
reciprocity (i.e., someone has done you a favor or provided you with a benefit of some sort) in
comparison to circumstances that call for negative reciprocity (i.e., someone has insulted or
taken detrimental action towards you). Therefore, the dependent measures for this study, positive
and negative reciprocity, are examined separately from one another.
Behavioral Reciprocity. As a behavioral response, one of the most common ways to
measure positive reciprocity is via the trust game. This is an experimental bargaining game
played between two people. It is typically played sequentially and proceeds as follows. First,
Player 1 is endowed with a certain amount of money (e.g., $10), then he/she is given the option
to invest some, none, or all of that money into a general fund, keeping the remainder for
him/herself. Any portion that is contributed to the general fund will be increased by some
amount (e.g., tripled, so that if the entire amount, $10, were invested then the general fund would
be worth $30). However, the general fund is under the control of Player 2, who is tasked with
deciding what proportion of the (now larger sum) to return to Player 1 and what proportion to
keep for his/herself. In the position of the second mover, the amount of money that Player 2
decides to return to Player 1 serves as a measure of positive reciprocity (Berg, et al. 1995),
because Player 1 only has the option of doing something that could benefit Player 2 or not, and
Player 2 only has the option of returning the benefit or not. For example, if Player 1 only decided
to contribute $1 out of a possible $10 to the general fund, and Player 2 was unhappy with the
amount that Player 1 had invested, there would not be anything that Player 2 could do to take
money away from Player 1. Given that Player 2 only has the option to withhold the contents of
the general fund ($3 in this case after the $1 was tripled in the general fund) and cannot do
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anything about the initial $9 that Player 1 decided to keep for him/herself. Therefore, Player 2
can only engage in varying degrees of positive reciprocity and does not have the opportunity to
engage in negative reciprocity.
Although there are many variations of this game (one-shot or repeated, with or without
communication, etc.) the game is typically played between strangers, under conditions of
anonymity, and as a one-shot interaction (where the game is played only once, and the partners
don’t expect to interact any further). Under these conditions, standard game theoretical models
predict that Player 1 will not contribute any money to the general fund (keeping the full
endowment for him/herself). These models also predict, that if Player 1 does contribute to the
general fund, then Player 2 will not reciprocate (i.e., return nothing). However, even under the
constraints of anonymous one-shot interactions with strangers, researchers consistently find that
individuals tend to invest (when in the position of Player 1) and reciprocate (when in the position
of Player 2) more than standard game theoretical models predict (Berg et al., 1995; Pillutla et al.,
2003).
In the original Trust Game study (Berg et al., 1995), Player 1 was endowed with $10 and
played with an anonymous Player 2 in a one-shot interaction. Player 1 contributed an average of
$5.16 (roughly 50% of the endowment) to the general fund, this amount was then tripled so that
there was an average of $15.48 in the general fund under the control of Player 2. The average
amount that Player 2 returned to Player 1 was $4.66 (about 30% of the general fund). Therefore,
on average, Player 1 walked away with $9.50. This is because Player 1 initially chose to keep
$4.84 and received $4.66 from Player 2, resulting in a total of $9.50, which is 50 cents less than
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Player 1 would’ve walked away with if he/she had not contributed anything. Player 2, on the
other hand, walked away with $10.82.
The researchers also found that roughly one-third (11 out of 30) Player 2s returned
enough money for Player 1 to achieve a net gain. They speculated that the remaining two-thirds
may have been acting according to their own self-interests. Alternatively, they reasoned, that in
situations where Player 1 did not contribute a large portion of the endowment to the general
fund, the amount that they contributed was not enough to induce feelings of obligation on the
part of Player 2. Consequently, Player 2 may not have interpreted Player 1s actions as a situation
where reciprocity is called for.
To further examine the relationship between the amount that Player 1 contributed to the
general fund and the amount that Player 2 returned to Player 1, Pillutla et al. (2003) conducted a
within-subjects study where participants played multiple rounds of the Trust Game in the role of
Player 2, each time ostensibly with a different Player 1 who had either been endowed with $10 or
$20. They played 6 rounds with Player 1s who had been endowed with $10, and contributed
either $2, $3, $5, $6, $9, or $10 to the general fund (participants were paired with one player
who contributed each amount). They also played 10 rounds with Player 1s who had been
endowed with $20, and contributed $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $9, $10, $12, $18, or $20 to the general
fund. The researchers found that there was a positive relationship between the proportion of the
endowment that Player 1 contributed to the general fund and the proportion of the general fund
(after multiplication) that Player 2 returned to Player 1. However, on average, Player 2 only
reciprocated enough for Player 1 to achieve a net gain when Player 1 contributed all (or nearly
all, $18 out of $20) endowment to the general fund.
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Under conditions where Player 1 had been endowed with $10 and contributed the entire
endowment to the general fund, Player 2 returned an average of $10.52 (only a net gain of 0.52
cents). Additionally, Pillutla et al. (2003) found that as long as Player 1 contributed half of the
endowment ($5) or more to the general fund, that Player 2 typically returned between 26.33%
and 35% of the general fund to Player 1, which is similar to the proportion of the general fund
that Player 2 returned to Player 1 in the original study (i.e., 30%). However, in cases where
Player 1 contributed minimal amounts (e.g., $2 or $3), Player 2 returned 11.67% or less of the
general fund to Player 2.
Pillutla et al. (2003) also noted that approximately 20% of Player 2s did not reciprocate
under any conditions, but that there was a significant increase in the rate of “zero returns” when
Player 1 had sent $2 or $3 out of a possible $10 (75% and 45% respectively). As hypothesized,
participants were less willing to reciprocate when doing so would mean that their outcomes
would be less than Player 1’s. This was the case with Player 1s who only contributed $2 and
kept the remaining $8 for themselves, leaving only $6 in the general fund for Player 2.
However, this does not explain why Player 2 was also less likely to reciprocate when
Player 1 contributed $3 to the general fund, given that Player 1 would have retained $7 while,
Player 2 would have received $9 and Player 2 still had the opportunity to equalize outcomes by
returning $1 to Player 1. Also, there is a substantial amount of variability in the way that the
Player 2s in this study decided to reciprocate in this instance. Out of 33 people, 15 decided not to
return anything (giving themselves a $2 advantage over their partners), 12 equalized outcomes
by returning $1, and 6 returned enough for Player 1 to walk away with more than them.
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One reason that the 15 people who decided not to reciprocate may have done so was
because Player 1 did not invest enough in the general fund for Player 2 to feel obligated to
reciprocate. In a post-experimental questionnaire, Pillutla et al. (2003) found that participants
reported weaker feelings of obligation when Player 1 had contributed minimal amounts. Further,
they found that feelings of obligation partially meditated the relationship between the amount
that Player 1 contributed to the general fund and the amount that Player 2 chose to reciprocate.
While the trust game provides a useful measure of positive reciprocity, Player 2 is only
given the opportunity to return a benefit to Player 1 and does not have the opportunity to reduce
the outcomes of Player 1 below the amount that he/she has already decided to keep for
him/herself. Hence, it doesn’t quite capture the construct of negative reciprocity, the behavioral
response of retaliating against the unfavorable treatment (or intentions) of someone else
(Gouldner, 1960). In a situation where Player 2 feels that he/she was treated unfavorably by
Player 1, Player 2 may choose not to reciprocate. However, he/she cannot do anything about the
money that Player 1 has already decided to keep for him/herself. To further illustrate the
restrictiveness of the trust game for measuring retaliation, imagine a trust game scenario where
Player 1 decides not to invest in the general fund at all, and to keep the initial $10 endowment to
him/herself. In this case, if Player 2 interprets Player 1’s actions as being detrimental to
Player 2’s interest, and wishes to retaliate, the framework of the game doesn’t provide Player 2
with an opportunity to do so. Player 2 simply would not have the opportunity to reciprocate.
Consequently, negative reciprocity is frequently measured by using different
experimental bargaining games, most commonly, the ultimatum game. Like the trust game, the
ultimatum game is also played sequentially and involves two players: a proposer and a
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responder. It proceeds as follows. The proposer is first endowed with a certain amount of money
(e.g., $20), and then tasked with proposing a way of dividing the money between him/herself and
the responder. Then, the responder has the option to accept or reject the proposer’s offer. If the
offer is accepted, then the amount is divided in the way that was proposed. On the other hand, if
the offer is rejected, then neither player receives anything (Ostrom & Walker, 2005). Thus, if the
responder feels that he/she has been treated unfavorably by the proposer, then he/she has an
opportunity to retaliate (i.e., to punish the proposer) by refusing the offer (which will ensure that
the proposer will not receive any money). Therefore, in order for the responder to punish the
proposer, the responder must forgo whatever amount of money the proposer had offered him/her
(assuming that the proposer offered the responder some amount of money that was greater than
$0). That is, the opportunity to punish comes at a cost. However, it’s important to note that the
more unfair the offer is, the less costly it is for responder to refuse the offer, and the more severe
the punishment is for the proposer.
Similar to the trust game, there are also many variations of this game (one-shot or
repeated, with or without communication, etc.). Typically, the game is played between
strangers, under conditions of anonymity, and as a one-shot interaction (where the game is
played only once, and the partners don’t expect to interact any further). Under these conditions,
standard game theoretical models predict that the proposer will propose a minimal amount of
money (e.g., to split $20 by offering to give the responder $1, keeping $19 for him/herself), and
that the responder will accept any offer that is greater than $0 (even if it is only $1). However,
even under the constraints of anonymous one-shot interactions with strangers, researchers
consistently find that a most proposers offer 40 to 50% of the endowment. Additionally, roughly
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half of all responders reject offers that are lower than 30% of the endowment, meaning that they
would rather forego any payment at all, than to accept unfair treatment (Guth & Kocher, 2014;
Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000).
Rabin (1993) posits that people not only reciprocate the actions of others, they also
reciprocate the intentions of others. In the case of the ultimatum game, responders are
interpreting the unfair proposals as the proposers’ intention to treat them unfavorably and
reciprocating in kind (by rejecting the proposal). In support of the hypothesis that responders are
basing the decision to accept or reject offers on the perceived intentions of the proposer, and not
on material outcomes for themselves, Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher (2003) conducted a study where
instead of being able to split the money up any way that they would like, proposers were forced
to choose among an array of preset proposals. They found that identical offers had different
rates of rejection, depending on whether the proposer’s offer communicated the intention to treat
the responder unfairly. When proposers’ actions communicated an intention to treat the
responder of unfairly (because they had the option of choosing a more even split), responders
were more likely to reject the offer than when the same offer was chosen by the proposer among
offers that were even more inequitable. These findings support the hypothesis that responders are
basing their decisions on the perceived intentions of the proposer.
Based upon the previously discussed research, two hypotheses emerge regarding positive
and negative reciprocity as behavioral outcomes. Because positive and negative reciprocity are
conceptually different from one another (Perugini et al., 2003; Eisenberger et al., 2004), and the
behavioral measures of these two constructs are different (the trust game is typically used to
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measure positive behavioral reciprocity while the ultimatum game is typically used to measure
negative behavioral reciprocity), I have developed distinct sets of hypotheses for each construct.
For this study, the dependent variable for all hypotheses involving positive reciprocity is
the percentage of the general fund that the participant, in the role of Player 2 of the trust game,
chose to return to Player 1. For this experiment, “partner behavior” refers to whether the
participant had been paired with a “stingy” or a “generous” Player 1. A stingy Player 1 is
defined as someone who invested $4 out of a possible $10 into the general fund. This amount
was chosen as the amount that a slightly stingy Player 1 would contribute to the general fund
because it is less than the amount that the average North American Player 1 would contribute to
the general fund, but less than a standard deviation below the mean (according to Johnson and
Mislin’s 2011 meta-analysis), and with $12 in the general fund, Player 2 still had the opportunity
to equalize outcomes (by returning $3). In contrast, a “generous” Player 1 is defined as someone
who chose to contribute the entire endowment to the general fund ($10).
Hypothesis P1: There will be a main effect of partner behavior, such that participants will
return a greater percentage of the general fund to generous Player 1s in comparison to stingy
Player 1s.
Distinctly, the dependent variable for all hypotheses involving negative reciprocity is
whether the participant, in the role of the Responder in the ultimatum game, decided to accept or
reject the proposal offered by a Proposer in the ultimatum game. For this portion of the
experiment, “partner behavior” referred to whether the participant had been paired with an
“unfair” or “fair” Proposer. An unfair Proposer is defined as someone who proposed a $12/$8
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split (in his/her own favor), a fair Proposer is defined as someone who proposed an even $10/$10
split.
Previous research indicates that, contrary to the game theory predictions that Player 1
should offer as little as possible, and that Player 2 should accept all offers that are greater than
zero, a significant proportion of people reject unfair offers, even if the differences are marginal.
Thus:
Hypothesis N1: There will be a main effect of partner behavior, such that participants
will be more likely to reject an unfair proposal than a fair proposal.
Norms of Reciprocity. Given the ubiquity of reciprocity, it is widely considered to be a
social norm. However, there appears to be some ambiguity within the literature regarding what
constitutes a social norm. In an effort to provide a clear definition of the term “social norm,”
Cialdini, Kallgren, and Reno (1991) define social norms as cultural codes of conduct and go on
to make a distinction between descriptive norms, injunctive norms, and personal norms.
Descriptive norms are defined as the perception of what people commonly do in a given
situation. For example, if an individual were to visit a park that he/she had never been to before
and noticed that there was litter on the ground, he/she may come away with the impression that
littering is normative behavior for that park and will be more likely to engage in littering.
Cialdini et al., (1991) assert that descriptive norms exert an influence on individuals’ behavior, in
part, because observing and mimicking the behaviors of others is a cognitively efficient strategy
of choosing behaviors. These norms rely heavily on the principal that, "If everyone is doing or
thinking or believing it, it must be a sensible thing to do or think or believe" (Cialdini, 1991).
Therefore, the more one observes others engaging in a behavior, the more likely one will
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perceive that behavior as normative for that particular time and place, and the more likely he/she
will choose to engage in that type of behavior.
In contrast to descriptive norms, which simply provide information regarding the
frequency of a behavior without necessarily being tied to the moral implications of a situation,
injunctive norms are defined as the moral expectations of how people ought to behave (Cialdini
et al., 1991). Injunctive norms exert an influence on behavior by way of informal external
sanctions that are imposed by others (e.g., parents, peers, society at large). Reciprocity widely
considered to be an injunctive social norm, considering the external sanctions that are associated
reciprocal behavior. Individuals who comply with injunctive norms are rewarded with social
approval and all of the benefits that accompany a favorable reputation. Conversely, those who
violate such norms run the risk of social disapproval and the disadvantages of a damaged
reputation. Therefore, one of the many reasons for complying with injunctive social norm such
as reciprocity, especially in public settings, may be because of reputational concerns. For
example, in general, individuals who comply with the norm of positive reciprocity are rewarded
with the development and continuation of beneficial relationships. In contrast, individuals who
fail to reciprocate run the risk of being ostracized, labeled as moochers and/or users.
Additionally, the damage to their reputations may cause them to miss out on relationships and
opportunities that otherwise would have been beneficial to them.
In order to examine the function of reciprocity as a social norm, Whatley, Webster,
Smith, & Rhodes (1999) conducted a study in which participants either were or were not given a
small favor by a confederate of the study and then asked to comply with a request to donate to a
charity on behalf of the confederate of the study. Whether the participant chose to contribute to

14
charity, and how much they chose to contribute (in the cases where they decide to contribute)
served as the measures of reciprocity. Further, they were either told that the amount that they
chose to contribute would be reported back to the confederate (in the “public” condition) or that
their contributions would be anonymous (in the private condition).
In terms of the participants’ binary decision of whether to donate to a charity on the
confederate’s behalf, the researchers found that there was a main effect of favor. Specifically, a
greater proportion of individuals contributed to charity on behalf of the confederate when he/she
had done them a favor (64%) in comparison to when the confederate had not done them a favor
(46%). They also found that there was a main effect of publicity, a greater proportion of
individuals contributed to charity on behalf of the confederate when in the public condition
(67%) than in the private condition (44%). In terms of the amounts that were donated, the
researchers found that there was a main effect for favor, participants who had been the recipients
of a favor by the confederate donated more money than participants who had not been the
recipients of a favor. There was also a main effect of publicity, participants chose to donate
more money in the public condition than in the private condition. Further, there was a
favor-by-publicity-interaction. Participants who had both been the recipient of a favor by the
confederate and who knew that the confederate would be able to see how much they had chosen
to donate on behalf of the confederate donated more money than the participants who were in the
public condition, but had not received a favor, and participants in the private condition.
Given that participants were more likely to donate, and donated a larger amount, when
they had been the recipients of a favor suggests that there are conditions that must be met before
the norm of reciprocity is activated. Specifically, the participant is only obligated to reciprocate,
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if they had been the recipient of a favor. Additionally, in the public condition, among the
participants who had been the recipient of a favor, more chose to donate, and donated a larger
amount. When considering reciprocity as in injunctive norm, these findings suggest that the
possibility of external sanctions plays a role in individuals’ decision to reciprocate. However,
the injunctive social norm of reciprocity does not explain why over half of the participants who
had been the recipient of a favor in the private condition also chose to donate, given that the
possibility of external sanctions had been eliminated in this condition.
One reason why over 50% of participants who had been the recipient of a favor in private
still chose to reciprocate may have been due to their own personal norms of reciprocity, instead
of strictly relying on externally enforced injunctive norms of reciprocity. Previous researchers
have found that there is a substantial amount of variance in the degree to which individuals are
likely to reciprocate under similar circumstances (Perugini et al. 2003). One explanation for this
variance is that there are individual differences in the degree to which people internalize
injunctive social norms such as reciprocity. Internalized norms are also called personal norms.
In contrast to injunctive norms, which are accompanied by external sanctions, Shwartz (1977)
defines personal norms as self-imposed standards of behavior that are self-sanctioned. The
researcher posits that to the degree that a social norm is regarded as prevalent and an acceptable
measure of self-evaluation, the individual is likely to internalize that social norm. Further,
individuals are motivated to comply with personal norms out of a desire to enhance and/or
preserve self-esteem and to avoid self-imposed distress. Given that there are individual
differences in the degree to which common social norms are internalized (due to differences in
learning from various personal experiences), individual differences arise in the degree to which
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one may adhere to a given social norm. This is consistent with research indicating that, despite
reciprocity being a wide-spread norm, there are differences in the degree to which individuals
reciprocate in response to identical situations (Ackermann, Fleiß & Murphy, 2014; Eisenberger,
Lynch, Aslage, & Rohdieck, 2004; Perugini et al., 2003).
One common way of measuring individual differences in the reciprocity is by way of the
Personal Norm of Reciprocity (PNR, Perugini et al., 2003) scale. This measure consists of 3
subscales (for positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and beliefs in reciprocity). There are 27
items in all, 9 that measure positive reciprocity with statements such as “ I am ready to undergo
personal costs to help somebody who helped me before,” 9 that measure negative reciprocity
with statements such as “If someone is unfair to me, I prefer to give him/her what s/he deserves
instead of accepting his/her apologies,” and 9 items that measure beliefs in reciprocity “I do not
behave badly with others so as to avoid them behaving badly with me.”
As measured by the PNR and other related measures, adherence to the norms of positive
reciprocity is either very weakly correlated, or not related at all, to adherence to the norm of
negative reciprocity. Further, positive reciprocity tends to be more strongly adhered to overall
than negative reciprocity, and there is significantly less variability in adherence to the norm of
positive reciprocity in comparison to the norm of negative reciprocity. Moreover, research
examining the endorsement of the norm of negative reciprocity (using a survey measure that is
very similar to the PNR) found that individuals who strongly adhered to the norm of negative
reciprocity reported higher levels of dispositional anger, expectational malevolence (the belief
that most other people are cruel, spiteful, and likely to take advantage of others), and were more
likely to direct ridicule at an acquaintance that had treated them unfavorably (Eisenberger et al.,
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2004). Given that those who strongly endorse the norm of negative reciprocity are quicker to
anger, and more likely to exact revenge, I predicted that participants who have higher scores on
the negative reciprocity subscale of the PNR will be more likely to reject unfair offers in the
ultimatum game. However, multiple studies have reported ceiling effects for the positive
reciprocity subscale; therefore, I did not make similar predictions regarding adherence to the
norm of positive reciprocity, and outcomes of the trust game. That is:
Hypothesis N2: There will be a significant partner-behavior-by-norm-adherence
interaction, whereby participants who strongly adhere to the norm of negative reciprocity will be
more likely to reject marginally unfair offers than participants who weakly adhere to the norm of
negative reciprocity, but participants who received a fair offer would reject offers at a similar
rate regardless of whether they strongly or weakly adhere to the norm of negative reciprocity.
Terror Management Theory
Terror Management Theory (Greenberg, et al. 1986) is a theory that was inspired by the
Pulitzer Prize winning works of Ernest Becker (Denial of Death; 1973, for a review see Burke et
al., 2009). One of the central tenets of Terror Management Theory is that, similar to other living
creatures, humans have a strong self-preservation instinct. However, unlike most other living
creatures, humans are also self-aware. Specifically, we are aware of our innate vulnerabilities
and the fact that death is inevitable. The instinctual drive to continue to exist, combined with the
knowledge that death is inevitable, creates the potential for humans to be terrorized by the threat
of death on a near constant basis. The theory goes on to suggest that in order for us to avoid
being perpetually paralyzed by thoughts of our inevitable demise, we require a buffer between

18
ourselves and anxiety provoking death-thoughts. This buffer consists of two essential elements:
(a) a protective cultural world-view and (b) positive self-esteem.
One’s cultural worldview consists of a socially and symbolically constructed perception
of reality that infuses life with meaning, order, purpose, and a set of standards by which to live.
Importantly, for those who live up to the standards of the cultural worldview, it also provides the
means for valued aspects of one’s self to live on perpetually, both literally (e.g., the belief in an
afterlife such as heaven, reincarnation, etc.) and figuratively (e.g., fame, accomplishments, etc.)
after the point that one’s biological body has passed away. Self-esteem is the other essential
element of the buffer between ourselves and the anxiety provoking death thoughts. Self-esteem
is derived from adhering to the values and meeting the standards of one’s cultural worldview.
To the degree that an individual sees him/herself as meeting (or exceeding) these standards,
he/she is able to maintain the view of him/herself as a worthwhile participant in a meaningful
world. In support of this aspect of the theory, research indicates that when self-esteem is
experimentally enhanced (or is dispositionally high), participants report less anxiety and exhibit
less anxiety-related defensiveness and physiological arousal in response to threatening stimuli
(e.g., reminders of human vulnerabilities to early death, threats to the validity of one’s
worldview, etc.) (Greenberg et al., 1993; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997).
However, given that one’s self-esteem is derived from the validity of his/her cultural
worldview and that there is more than just one cultural worldview, the potential for conflict (with
those who do not share our worldview) and a weakening of the buffer remains. While one may
perceive his/her worldview as absolute reality, it is actually a fragile social construction. The
salience of other worldviews, especially dissimilar worldviews, makes this more apparent than it
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is typically. Given that there is a wide array of different (and sometimes competing) cultural
worldviews with which one may come in contact, there is a wide array of standards by which one
may estimate self-worth. Cultural worldviews that are dissimilar to one’s own may find the
individual lacking. Therefore, one’s cultural worldview requires continual consensual validation
from others in order to serve its function as a death-thoughts anxiety buffer. Further, those with
non-similar worldviews are likely to be perceived as a threat. In order to maintain the integrity
of the anxiety buffer, Terror Management Theory suggests that a broad set of human behaviors
are oriented towards attaining validation of, and defense against threats to, one’s worldview
(Burke et al., 2009). This line of reasoning leads to the mortality salience hypothesis.
Mortality Salience Hypothesis. The mortality salience hypothesis states that to the
extent that one’s cultural worldview (and the self-esteem derived from it) serves as a buffer
between the self and anxiety provoking death-thoughts, reminding people that humans are
innately vulnerable and that death is inevitable should increase the need to shore-up the buffer by
way of defending one’s worldview.
In mortality salience studies, reminders of death have been operationalized in a multitude
of ways (e.g., exposing participants to graphic motor vehicle accident footage, fear of death
measurement scales, having participants walk through a cemetery at night, and asking
participants open-ended questions regarding what they think their own death will be
like)(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; Pyszcynski, Greenberg,
Solomon, 1999). Among these various procedures, the most common mortality salience
induction is to have the participant answer death related questions: “Please briefly describe the
emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you” and “Jot down, as specifically as
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you can, what you think will happen to you physically as you die and once you are physically
dead.” The control group for these studies is typically asked the same questions, but about
watching television or going to the dentist instead of death. For example, “Please briefly describe
the emotions that the thought of watching television arouses in you,” and “Jot down as
specifically as you can, what you think happens to you as you watch television and once you
have physically watched television” (Burke et al., 2009).
In support of the mortality salience hypothesis, studies have found that an increase in
mortality salience is associated with a broad array of behavioral and attitudinal outcomes, such
as an increase in unfavorable attitudes towards those who criticize the culture, an increase in
aggression towards others who hold dissimilar attitudes, an increase in uneasiness when
performing tasks that are outside of one’s cultural norms, an increase in the perception of social
consensus for one’s attitudes, increased intergroup bias in favor of the ingroup, increased
adherence to salient norms and values, increased nationalism, increased stereotyping and
prejudice, and increased patriotism (Burke et al., 2009; Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Galliot et al.,
2008).
One question that has been raised about the mortality salience hypothesis, is whether
other types of anxiety provoking thoughts (e.g., thoughts about one’s next important exam, the
expectation of intense pain, or public speaking) would produce the same effects as mortality
salience. In support of the mortality salience hypothesis, researchers have repeatedly found that
the increased need to defend one’s worldview is unique to mortality salience and not to other
types of anxiety provoking stimuli (Burke et al., 2009).
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Another prominent question that has been raised about the mortality salience hypothesis
is whether thinking about the death of a loved one is likely to prompt defense of the worldview
attitudes and behaviors. Greenberg et al. (1994) reasoned that death-thoughts prompt defense of
the worldview because of our biological self-preservation instinct, so the death of someone else
should not directly trigger defense of the worldview. However, it is likely that thinking of the
death of a loved one is likely to remind the individual of his/her own mortality. Therefore, the
researchers hypothesized that mortality salience questions that have to do with the death of a
loved one will trigger defense of the worldview, but this effect should be significantly weaker
than self-relevant mortality salience questions. The pattern of results they obtained supported
their hypothesis.
Another mortality salience research question is whether more pronounced mortality
salience manipulations would produce stronger defense of the worldview effects.
Counter-intuitively, previous research has indicated that stronger mortality salience inductions
(e.g., guiding participants through an intense visualization of imminent death due to a terminal
disease) consistently fail to reproduce the effects of subtler mortality salience manipulations
(Greenberg et al., 1994). To explain why subtle manipulations result in an increased need for
self-esteem and defense of the worldview, while more intense manipulations do not, Pyszczynski
et al. (1990) developed, and experimentally tested, a dual-process model of defense against
death-related thoughts as an extension of terror management theory.
The Dual-Process Model of Defense. Pyszczynski et al.’s (1990) dual-process model of
defense relies heavily on a distinction between conscious and unconscious thought processes and
subsequent defense systems. In general, consciousness is defined as awareness. This awareness
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applies to a number of different context (e.g., awareness of one’s self, awareness of one’s
environment, awareness of one’s thoughts, awareness of one’s bodily sensations, etc.). Contrary
to the way that we often think of consciousness in everyday life (i.e., as being dichotomous such
that a person is either conscious and awake or unconscious due to being asleep or in a coma)
most researchers agree that consciousness is not dichotomous. Rather consciousness is
considered to be continuous; as long as we are alive, we retain some form of awareness of
ourselves and our environments. Consequently, instead of being conceptualized as off or on,
there are various states of consciousness that range from states of low awareness (e.g., coma,
sleep, daydreaming, unconscious processing) to states of high awareness (e.g., when we are
engaged in making important decisions, mindfulness, and/or active problem-solving).
Bargh & Morsella (2008) note that while there seems to be consensus within the field of
psychology regarding the definition of conscious thoughts and thought processes, there is less
consensus about the definition of unconscious thoughts and thought processes. They state that
conscious (high awareness) thought and thought processes have the qualities of being intentional,
controllable, taxing (in terms of the consumption of one’s exhaustible cognitive resources), and
accessible (meaning that the person is accurately able to report perceived stimuli). In contrast,
unconscious thought and thought processes as considered to fall under the wide umbrella of
states of awareness that lack one or more of the key elements of conscious awareness. These
authors identity two different conceptualizations of unconscious processes that have been
featured prominently in the literature in the past 30 years: (a) skills-acquisition research that has
examined the gains in efficiency that come with practice and eventually mastery when a skill
becomes subconscious (e.g., driving), and (b) the processing of stimuli the influences of which
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one is not aware (e.g., priming, where one may be aware of the prime itself but not aware of the
effect that the prime is having on him/her). Pyszcynski et al.’s (1990) dual-process model of
defense utilizes this second conceptualization of unconscious processes.
Specifically, this model suggests conscious thoughts of death (of which the participant is
fully aware and easily able to report) trigger proximal defenses. Proximal defenses entail
seemingly rational threat-focused attempts to diminish the anxiety associated with death, and not
the defense of one’s worldview. Rather, proximal defenses include mechanisms such as
suppression (trying not the think about it), denying one’s vulnerability to death (e.g., reflecting
upon one’s excellent health, the thought that longevity runs in one’s family, cognitive distortions
that lead one to underestimate his/her vulnerability to injury and/or illness etc.), and pushing the
problem of death into the far distant future. However, while proximal defenses may be
successful at suppressing death-thoughts and removing them from the focal point of conscious
awareness, none of the proximal defenses are able to effectively solve the problem of death given
that death is an inevitability. Therefore, even if the individual is no longer aware of the death
thoughts, these thoughts are still likely to remain highly accessible and to exert an influence on
one’s behavior. This model suggests that unconscious thoughts of death (those that may be
highly accessible and still likely to produce an effect on one’s behavior, but outside of the realm
of one’s focused attention and therefore not reportable) are responded to with distal defenses.
In contrast to proximal defenses, which are conscious, seemingly rational, and threatfocused, distal defenses are unconscious, diffuse, symbolic mechanisms that are aimed at
fostering the notion that one is a valuable participant in a meaningful world and therefore worthy
of the transcendence of death that one’s cultural worldview offers. Distal defenses entail
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increased defense of the validity of one’s worldview and an increased motivation to maintain
and/or bolster self-esteem; in short, finding ways to shore up the death-thoughts buffer
(Pyszczynski et al.,1990; Burke et al., 2010; Hayes & Schimel, 2018). Additionally, research has
found that when distal defenses are weak (due to conditions such as low trait self-esteem), or
these processes have been interfered with (e.g., by way of experimental manipulations that
instruct participants to consider the inadequacies and contradictions in their worldview, or to
think about their personal shortcomings), individuals are likely to experience hopelessness,
despair, and fatalistic withdrawal from life (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2012; Hayes, Ward,
McGregor, 2016).
To bring all of these concepts together, the researchers posit that when individuals are
consciously aware of death-related stimuli, proximal and distal defenses are activated by way of
the following sequence: (a) thoughts of death enter the realm of one’s focused attention;
(b) proximal defenses are activated (i.e., suppression, denial, rationalizations and/ or cognitive
distortions); (c) there is an unconscious increase in the accessibility of death-related thoughts
outside of the realm of one’s focused attention; (d) distal defenses are activated (i.e., defending
one’s worldview and bolstering and/or maintaining self-esteem); (e) after the buffer has been
strengthened, unconscious death thought accessibility is reduced and the potential for terror is
considered to have been averted (Pyszczynski et al.,1990; Greenberg et al., 2000).
In order to test the dual-process model of defense, Greenberg et al. (1994) conducted a
series of four studies, three of which were designed to determine the role of consciousness and
accessibility of death-related thoughts on mortality salience effects. The first study examined the
effect of subtle versus blatant mortality salience manipulations on defense of the worldview.
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They were also interested in comparing the effects of contemplating one’s own death to the
effect of contemplating the death of a loved one. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
five different treatments. In the “subtle own death” treatment participants were asked to answer
a mortality salience question that consisted of two open ended standard mortality salience
questions. Specifically, “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death
arouses in you,” and “Jot down as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you
physically as you die and once you are physically dead.” In the “subtle other’s death” treatment,
participants were asked to complete a similar questionnaire, but the questions were about the
death of a loved one (“Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your loved one’s
death arouses in you,” and “Jot down as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to
your loved one physically as he/she dies and once he/she is physically dead.) In the control
treatment participants were not asked about death. Instead they were asked to answer questions
about television. Specifically, they were asked “Please briefly describe the emotions that the
thought of watching arouses in you,” and “Jot down as specifically as you can, what you think
happens to you physically as you watch television and once you have physically watched
television. In the “deeper own salient” and “deeper other’s death” treatments, participants
completed the same mortality salience questionnaires that were asked in the subtle conditions
and then asked to complete an additional questionnaire that delved deeper into their thoughts and
feelings about death (either their own death or the death of a loved one). They were also asked
to write extensively about their deepest fears about death. After completing one of these five
treatments, participants are instructed to complete a filler task, and asked to read two essays that
had been written by two different authors. They were told that both essays had been written by
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foreign students who were currently living in the United States. One of the essays espoused
favorable views of the United States and the other espoused unfavorable view of the United
States. After reading the essays, participants were asked to complete an evaluation measure that
consisted of questions regarding the degree to which the participants considered the author of
each essay to be knowledgeable, intelligent, and likeable. The participants were also asked to
assess the degree to which they agreed the arguments in the essay and the degree to which they
considered the arguments to be valid. The difference between participant’s evaluation of the
pro-American essay and the anti-American essay served as the measure of defense of the
worldview for this study. The researcher found that the effects of mortality salience on the
worldview were stronger when a more subtle mortality salience induction was used.
Specifically, participants who had received the “subtle own death” treatment exhibited a greater
preference for the pro-U.S. essays than the participants in any of the other conditions. The
researchers concluded that this occurred because more obvious manipulations activated proximal
defenses (e.g., suppression and denial), whereas more subtle manipulations activated distal
defenses (e.g., defense of the worldview). As a secondary finding, they also found that reminders
of the mortality of loved one had an effect of on defense of worldview in comparison to the
deeper conditions and the control condition, but to a lesser extent.
The second and third studies illustrated there is stronger effect of mortality salience on
worldview defense if participants engage in a distraction task in between the mortality salience
induction and the defense of the worldview assessment, but not if they are instructed to continue
to think about death. Additionally, in a condition where participants were instructed to write
down whatever came to mind during the time between the mortality salience induction and the
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defense of the worldview assessment, they found that the less participants wrote about death, the
more likely they were to defend the worldview. The researchers interpreted this pattern of
effects as an indication that the participants who spontaneously continued to write about death,
still had death thoughts at the forefront of their attention; therefore, these thoughts were
activating proximal defenses. In contrast, for participants who were no longer spontaneously
writing about death, the researchers assumed that the death thoughts had been effectively
suppressed by the proximal defenses, but although no longer at the forefront of their attention
these thoughts were still highly accessible. In sum, this series of studies provides support for the
hypothesis that the effect of mortality salience on defense of the worldview takes place when
thoughts of death are accessible, but not at the forefront of one’s attention.
Further support for the dual-process model of defense comes from research that has
found that the presence of a cognitive load appears to interfere with proximal defense
mechanisms (e.g., suppression, denial, and rationalization), and leads to an immediate increase in
distal defense mechanisms (e.g., death-thought accessibility, and worldview defense).
Additionally, research has indicated that when death-related stimuli are presented subliminally
(i.e., participants are unable to accurately report that they have seen the word “death” flash onto
a screen at which they were looking), that defense of the worldview is immediately increased.
Also, subliminal presentations of the word “pain” and slower presentations of the word death
(which participants are able to accurately report seeing and therefore consciously aware of) were
not associated with a similar increase in defense of the worldview (Greenberg et al., 2000).
Finally, Burke et al. (2009) conducted a mortality salience meta-analysis examining 164
articles with 277 experiments over the course of 20 years. Among other important aspects, they
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examined the effect of a delay/distraction task between the mortality salience induction task and
the dependent variable. Common distraction tasks in mortality salience studies include the
completion of survey measures (e.g., the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PANAS), word
searches, and reading comprehension tasks (i.e., having the participant read a passage from a
book or essay and then answer questions about it). They found that, experiments that used two or
three delay tasks produced significantly larger effect sizes than experiments that used only one
delay task. They also found similar effects when they analyzed approximate length of time
passed instead of number of delay tasks. Experiments with longer delays (ranging from 7 to 20
minutes) between the mortality salience manipulation and the dependent variable produced
larger effects than shorter delays (2 to 6 minutes). Both of these findings add support to the
dual-process model of defense, by reinforcing the idea that mortality salience effects on
phenomena such as defense of the worldview and increased need for positive self-esteem are due
to distal processes that are only activated when death-related thoughts have faded from our
sphere of focused attention but still remain accessible.
Mortality Salience & Reciprocity. Previous research on the impact of mortality
salience on norm and value adherence has found that mortality salience is associated with an
increased desire to live up to salient norms and values as a way of defending one’s cultural
worldview and maintaining the self-esteem derived from it. Relatedly, Schindler, Reinhard, &
Stahlberg (2012) found that mortality salience was associated with an increase in the importance
of reciprocity overall. Interestingly, they also found that mortality salience was associated with
an increased motivation to engage in negative reciprocity, but not positive reciprocity. However,
because the mean scores of positive reciprocity were high before the mortality salience

29
induction, the authors interpreted the lack of an increase in positive reciprocity as being due to a
ceiling effect. Schindler et al. (2012) also tested their hypothesis that negative reciprocity is
valued less than positive reciprocity overall, and that adherence to the negative reciprocity is
more dispositionally dependent. In support of their hypothesis, they found that self-reported
scores for positive reciprocity were significantly higher and less variable than scores for negative
reciprocity.
Hypothesis N3: There will be a significant partner-behavior-by-mortality-salience
interaction, whereby participants in the mortality salient condition will be more likely to reject
marginally unfair offers than participant in the mortality not salient condition, but participants
who receive fair offers will reject at a similar rate regardless of whether or not they have been
primed with mortality salience.
Hypothesis P2: There will be a significant partner-behavior-by-mortality-salience
interaction, such that participants will return a smaller portion of the general fund to a stingy
Player 1 when they had been primed with mortality salience in comparison to when they had
received the control prime (mortality not salient). By contrast, I expected participants to return
similar amounts of the general fund to generous Player 1s, regardless of whether or not they had
been primed with mortality salience.
Hypothesis N4: There will be a 3-way interaction between partner behavior, mortality
salience, and norm adherence. Specifically, I expect that the two-way interaction between norm
adherence and partner behavior described in Hypothesis N2 to be significantly greater in the
mortality salience condition in comparison to the mortality not salient condition. In particular, I
expect that participants who strongly adhere to the norm of negative reciprocity and had been
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primed with mortality salience will be more likely to reject marginally unfair offers than
participants in any of the other conditions.
To further investigate the effect of mortality salience, Schindler, et al. (2012) conducted
two studies that examined the effect of mortality salience on positive and negative reciprocity
separately. In these studies participants were asked to imagine how much they would leave as a
tip in a hypothetical scenario where the owner of a café had either brought them a free espresso,
or where they did not receive a free espresso. The results indicated that participants in the
mortality salience condition reported that they would leave a significantly higher tip than those in
the TV condition, but only when the owner had brought them a free espresso. The authors
interpreted this to indicate that mortality salience is associated with an increase in positive
reciprocity, but only in situations where the norm of positive reciprocity had been activated (by
way of having someone do them a favor).
Group Membership
Burke et al. (2009) found that mortality salience impacts attitudes towards other people
more than it impacts other types of attitudes. It is well known that mortality salience is associated
with an increase in inter-group bias in favor of the ingroup, even in a minimal-group context
(Harmon-Jones et al., 1996; Castano, 2004; Dechesne, Greenberg, Arndt, & Schimel, 2000;
Dechesne, Janssen, & van Knippenberg, 2000). Further research on ingroup favoritism has
found that there are certain conditions under which the effect of group membership is likely to be
stronger (see Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014 for a review). In a meta-analysis, Balliet et al., found
that situations of interdependence between group members (including social dilemmas such as
trust games and ultimatum games) produce a stronger ingroup favoritism effect than situations
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that lack mutual interdependence (e.g., dictator games). They also found that the effect is
stronger under conditions of common knowledge of group membership status than in conditions
of unilateral knowledge, where only one individual in the interaction knows the group
membership status of the others.
Consistent with these findings, Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi (2009) conducted two
studies to determine whether a preference for being paired with an ingroup member during a
dictator game was due to positive stereotypes of ingroup members (e.g., stereotypes of ingroup
members as being nicer, more helpful, and having better qualities overall, making them more
deserving of favorable treatment) or the expectation that they will receive more favorable
treatment from ingroup members. In the first study, participants were told that they would be
playing a dictator game. Dictator games involve two individuals, an allocator and a recipient.
The allocator is given an endowment and asked to determine how much of that endowment
he/she would like to give to the recipient. In this study, played the role of the recipient and were
told that the allocators in the study had been given an endowment of $16 to divide between
themselves and of the one of the recipients in the study. They are also told that the allocators had
already decided how they want to split the $16 between themselves and one of the recipients. At
this point, the participant chose between accepting the unknown amount of money that had been
allocated by an ingroup member (someone who attended the same university that they did) or
accepting the unknown amount of money that had been allocated by an outgroup member
(someone who attend a different university). In the common-knowledge condition, participants
were told that allocators had known the group-membership status of the participant when he/she
was making the allocation decision. In the private-knowledge (mutual independence) condition,

32
participants were told that the allocator did not know the participant’s group membership status
when he/she was making the allocation decision.
The researchers hypothesized that if ingroup favoritism (a recipient’s preference ingroup
allocators) is due to positive stereotypes (e.g., the belief that ingroup members are nicer, more
generous people overall), then participants should choose ingroup allocators over outgroup
allocators, regardless of whether the allocator was aware of the group membership status of the
recipient at the time that he/she was made the allocation. However, if ingroup favoritism is due
to the expectation of more favorable treatment from fellow ingroup members, then participants
should show a preference for ingroup allocators in the common-knowledge condition, but not in
the private-knowledge condition. The results provided strong support for the idea that ingroup
favoritism (the preference for an ingroup allocator) is due to an expectation of more favorable
treatment from fellow ingroup members, and not generally positive stereotypes of the ingroup.
Specifically, 100% of the participants in the common knowledge condition chose an ingroup
allocator, in comparison to only 53% of the participants in the private knowledge condition.
In a second study, they further examined the role of ingroup stereotypes and ingroup
expectations of favorable treatment. The procedures of the second study were the same as the
first, with a couple of exceptions. First, ingroup/outgroup determinations were made by
academic major, instead of being made by school. All participants were psychology majors, and
ingroup members were considered to be other psychology majors. The second, and more
important, change is that there were two different types of outgroups, one that was associated
with stereotypes that were more positive than the ingroup’s (i.e., nursing majors), and another
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outgroup that was associated with stereotypes that were more negative than the ingroup’s (i.e.,
economics majors). 1
The researchers hypothesized that the stereotype valence of the outgroup member would
not matter in the common-knowledge condition, that participants would show a preference for
ingroup allocators, even if they were given the option to choose an outgroup allocator whose
group was associated with more positive stereotypes (i.e., a nursing student). Further, they
hypothesized that in the private knowledge group, participants would base their decisions on
stereotypes and not group membership (i.e., participants would choose nursing major allocators
over ingroup psychology majors and outgroup economics majors). The pattern of results that
they obtained supported both of these hypotheses. Overall, these two studies illustrate the
conditions under which ingroup favoritism (a preference for ingroup allocators in this case) is
based on positive stereotypes versus expectations that the ingroup will treat one favorably are
likely to emerge. Specifically, under conditions of common knowledge, ingroup favoritism is
based on expectations of favorable treatment of ingroup members. However, under conditions of
unilateral knowledge, preferences for allocators are based on the stereotypes of the group.
In addition to expecting preferential treatment from fellow ingroup members, individuals
often punish ingroup members who violate these expectations (Marques & Paez, 1994). To
examine the relationship between group membership and the expectations of fairness from
others, Mendoza et al. (2014) conducted two studies using the ultimatum game. In the first

1

In a preliminary investigation of positive and negative stereotypes, the researchers found that students in their
participant pool possess very high positive stereotypes of the nursing majors, a moderate level of positive
stereotypes of psychology majors, and very low level of positive stereotypes of economic majors. They also found
that students possess very high negative stereotypes of economics majors, a moderate level of negative stereotypes
of psychology majors, and very low levels of negative stereotypes of nursing majors.
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study, the proposer was either an ingroup member or an outgroup member and made an offer that
ranged from an equal ($10/$10) split to a decidedly one-sided ($16/$4) split in favor of the
proposer. As hypothesized, participants accepted most fair offers and rejected most unfair offers,
regardless of the group membership of the proposer. Additionally, they found that participants
were more likely to reject the marginally unfair offer (of a $12/$8 split favoring the proposer) of
an ingroup proposer, than an outgroup proposer. This effect was replicated in a second study
that compared only fair and marginally unfair proposals.
I expected to see similar results in the current study. Additionally, I expected the effect
to be strengthened by mortality salience, and for those who strongly adhere to the norms of
negative reciprocity, because mortality salience increases the importance of valued norms. Thus,
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis N5: There will be significant interaction between group membership and
partner behavior, whereby participants will be more likely to reject marginally unfair offers from
ingroup members than outgroup members, but will reject fair offers at about the same rate
regardless of the group membership of the proposer.
Hypothesis N6: There will be a 3-way interaction between group membership, partner
behavior, and mortality salience. Specifically, I expected that the two-way interaction between
group membership and partner behavior predicted in Hypothesis N5 to be greater in the mortality
salience condition in comparison to the mortality not salient condition. In particular, I expected
that participants who had been primed with mortality salience and received a marginally unfair
offer from an ingroup member would be more likely to reject the proposal than participants in
any other condition.
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Hypothesis N7: There will be a significant 3-way interaction between group
membership, partner behavior, and adherence to the norm of negative reciprocity. Specifically, I
expected that the two-way interaction between partner behavior and adherence to the norm of
negative reciprocity predicted in Hypothesis N2 to be greater in the ingroup condition than the
outgroup condition. In particular, I expected that participants who strongly adhere to the norm of
negative reciprocity and had received an unfair offer from an ingroup member would be more
likely to reject the proposal in comparison to the participants in any of the other conditions.
The Mendoza et al. (2014) study specifically examined negative reciprocity using the
ultimatum game. However, it possible that a similar pattern of results could emerge using the
trust-game under conditions where participants who strongly adhere to the norm of negative
reciprocity have been paired with a stingy ingroup member. Although, as stated before,
participants are not given the chance to directly engage in negative reciprocity in the trust game
(the structure of the game does not allow them to affect the money that Player 1 withheld from
the general fund) I did expect a reduction in positive reciprocity from Player 2s who had been
paired with a less generous (stingy) Player 1. Thus, the following set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis P3: There will be a significant partner-behavior-by-group-membership
interaction, such that participants will return a smaller portion of the general fund to stingy
ingroup members in comparison to stingy outgroup members, but will return similar amounts
(proportions of the general fund that are not significantly different from one another) to a
generous Player 1 regardless of group membership.
Hypothesis P4: There will be a 3-way interaction between partner behavior, group
membership, and mortality salience. Specifically, I expected that the two-way interaction
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between partner behavior and group membership described in hypothesis P3 will be significantly
greater in the mortality salience condition in comparison to the mortality not salient condition. In
particular, I expected that participants in the mortality salient condition will return a smaller
percentage of the general fund to stingy ingroup members in comparison to participants in any of
the other conditions.
Recap of the Hypotheses
Based on the previously discussed research, several hypotheses emerged regarding how
mortality salience, group-membership, and individual differences in adherence to the norms of
reciprocity impact both positive and negative reciprocity as behavioral outcomes. Because
positive and negative reciprocity are conceptually different from one another (Perugini et al.,
2003; Eisenberger et al., 2004), and the behavioral measures of these two constructs are different
(the trust game is typically used to measure positive behavioral reciprocity and the ultimatum
game is typically used to measure negative behavioral reciprocity), I developed distinct sets of
hypotheses for each construct.
Predictions for positive reciprocity. The dependent variable for all hypotheses
involving positive reciprocity was the proportion of the general fund that the participant, in the
role of Player 2 in the trust game, returned to Player 1 in the trust game. For this game, “partner
behavior” refers to whether the participant had been paired with a “stingy” or “generous”
Player 1. A stingy Player 1 was defined as someone who invested $4 out of a possible $10 into
the general fund, whereas a generous Player 1 was defined as someone who invested the entire
endowment of $10 into the general fund. The specific predictions for positive reciprocity are
listed in Table 1.
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Table 1. Predictors for Multiple Regression & Related Hypotheses for Positive Reciprocity
Predictors
Partner Behavior
Partner Behavior x
Mortality Salience

Partner Behavior x Group
Membership

Partner Behavior x Group
Membership x Mortality
Salience

Hypotheses
P1: There will be a main effect of partner behavior, such that
participants will return a greater percentage of the general fund
to generous Player 1s in comparison to stingy Player 1s.
P2: There will be a significant partner-behavior-by-mortalitysalience interaction, such that participants will return a smaller
portion of the general fund to a stingy Player 1 when they had
been primed with mortality salience in comparison to when
they had received the control prime (mortality not salient). By
contrast, I expected participants to return similar amounts of
the general fund to generous Player 1s, regardless of whether or
not they had been primed with mortality salience.
P3: There will be a significant partner-behavior-by-groupmembership interaction, such that participants will return a
smaller portion of the general fund to stingy ingroup members
in comparison to stingy outgroup members, but will return
similar amounts (proportions of the general fund that are not
significantly different from one another) to a generous Player 1
regardless of group membership.
P4: There will be a 3-way interaction between partner behavior,
group membership, and mortality salience. Specifically, I
expected that the two-way interaction between partner behavior
and group membership described in hypothesis P3 will be
significantly greater in the mortality salience condition in
comparison to the mortality not salient condition. In particular,
I expected that participants in the mortality salient condition
will return a smaller percentage of the general fund to stingy
ingroup members in comparison to participants in any of the
other conditions.

Predictions for negative reciprocity. Several hypotheses also emerged regarding the
impact of mortality salience, group membership, and adherence to the personal norm of negative
reciprocity on behavioral negative reciprocity. The dependent variable for all hypotheses
involving negative reciprocity was whether the participant, in the role of the Responder decided
to accept or reject the proposal offered by a Proposer in the ultimatum game. For this portion of
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the experiment, “partner behavior” refers to whether the participant had been paired with an
“unfair” or “fair” Proposer. An unfair Proposer is defined as someone who proposed a $12/$8
split (in his/her own favor), a fair Proposer is defined as someone who proposed an even $10/$10
split. The specific predictions for negative reciprocity are listed in Table 2.
Table 2. Predictors for Multiple Regression & Related Hypotheses for Negative Reciprocity
Predictors
Partner Behavior
Partner Behavior x Norm
Adherence

Partner Behavior x
Morality Salience

Partner Behavior x
Mortality Salience x Norm
Adherence

Hypotheses
N1: There will be a main effect of partner behavior, such that
participants will be more likely to reject an unfair proposal than
a fair proposal.
N2: There will be a significant partner-behavior-by-normadherence interaction, whereby participants who strongly
adhere to the norm of negative reciprocity will be more likely
to reject marginally unfair offers than participants who weakly
adhere to the norm of negative reciprocity, but participants who
received a fair offer would reject offers at a similar rate
regardless of whether they strongly or weakly adhere to the
norm of negative reciprocity.
N3: There will be a significant partner-behavior-by-mortalitysalience interaction, whereby participants in the mortality
salient condition will be more likely to reject marginally unfair
offers than participant in the mortality not salient condition, but
participants who receive fair offers will reject at a similar rate
regardless of whether or not they have been primed with
mortality salience.
N4: There will be a 3-way interaction between partner
behavior, mortality salience, and norm adherence. Specifically,
I expect that the two-way interaction between norm adherence
and partner behavior described in Hypothesis N2 to be
significantly greater in the mortality salience condition in
comparison to the mortality not salient condition. In particular,
I expect that participants who strongly adhere to the norm of
negative reciprocity and had been primed with mortality
salience will be more likely to reject marginally unfair offers
than participants in any of the other conditions.

39
Group Membership x
Partner Behavior

Group Membership x
Partner Behavior x
Mortality Salience

Group Membership x
Partner Behavior x Norm
Adherence

N5: There will be significant interaction between group
membership and partner behavior, whereby participants will be
more likely to reject marginally unfair offers from ingroup
members than outgroup members, but will reject fair offers at
about the same rate regardless of the group membership of the
proposer.
N6: There will be a 3-way interaction between group
membership, partner behavior, and mortality salience.
Specifically, I expected that the two-way interaction between
group membership and partner behavior predicted in
Hypothesis N5 to be greater in the mortality salience condition
in comparison to the mortality not salient condition. In
particular, I expected that participants who had been primed
with mortality salience and received a marginally unfair offer
from an ingroup member would be more likely to reject the
proposal than participants in any other condition.
N7: There will be a significant 3-way interaction between
group membership, partner behavior, and adherence to the
norm of negative reciprocity. Specifically, I expected that the
two-way interaction between partner behavior and adherence to
the norm of negative reciprocity predicted in Hypothesis N2 to
be greater in the ingroup condition than the outgroup condition.
In particular, I expected that participants who strongly adhere
to the norm of negative reciprocity and had received an unfair
offer from an ingroup member would be more likely to reject
the proposal in comparison to the participants in any of the
other conditions.

CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants & Research Design
Four-hundred-twenty-two undergraduate students enrolled in introduction to psychology
courses participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit. Additionally, 1 in 10 won
an Amazon Gift card. The value of the gift card depended in part on the choices participants
made during the experiment. Specifically, they were awarded the amount that they walked away
with at the end of either the trust game or the ultimatum game. The data for 11 participants were
omitted from the final data set because of mathematical errors that they made during the trust
game or the ultimatum game. The data for 3 participants were omitted because they did not
complete one or more of the survey measures. The data for 6 participants were omitted because
they were unable to correctly identify the group they allegedly belonged to. Finally, complete
data for 18 participants were omitted in order to keep all cells the same size. The decision about
which specific participants to omit from cells that had too many participants was random.
The final data set consisted of 384 adults between the ages of 18 and 40 (M = 19.08,
SD = 1.51). Of this sample, 271 were women (70.6%), 112 were men (29.2%), and one person
chose “prefer not to respond.” Additionally, the sample was primarily Caucasian (183, 47.7 %),
with smaller numbers of Asian (80, 20.8 %), Black (26, 6.8 %), Latino/Hispanic (53, 13.8 %),
Middle Eastern (9, 2.3 %), and multiracial (26, 6.8%) participants. Five (1.3 %) participants
chose “prefer not respond,” and two participants stated that their race had not been listed.
40
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Hypotheses related to positive and negative behavioral reciprocity were tested separately.
To test hypotheses regarding positive reciprocity, participants played a trust game, in the context
of a 2 (Mortality Salience: Salient vs. Not Salient) x 2 (Group Membership: Ingroup vs.
Outgroup) x 2 (Partner Behavior: Generous vs. Stingy) between-subjects experimental design.
In contrast, to test hypotheses regarding negative reciprocity, participants played an ultimatum
game in the context of a 2 (Mortality Salience: Salient vs. Not Salient) x 2 (Group Membership:
Ingroup vs. Outgroup) x 2 (Partner Behavior: Fair vs. Unfair) between-subjects experimental
design. Adherence to the norm of negative reciprocity was also measured and statistically
analyzed in the context of these other factors (i.e., mortality salience, group membership, and
partner behavior).
Procedure & Materials
Most of the data collection took place in a laboratory setting with single or multiple (up
to 18) individuals participating simultaneously. However, before coming to the experiment
session, individuals were instructed to complete an online questionnaire. See Figure 2 for an
illustration of the order of data collection procedures. Materials are described below in the order
in which participants encountered them.
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Figure 1. The order of data collection procedures.

Note: Steps 8 and 9 were counter balanced. *PNR = Personal Norm of Reciprocity scale.
**PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule.
Painting Preferences Questionnaire. When individuals signed-up to participate in the
study, they were instructed to complete an online 10-item forced choice “Painting Preferences
Questionnaire” before coming the session (see Appendix A). For each item in the questionnaire
participants were presented a with a pair of paintings side-by-side (one by Kandinsky and the
other by Klee), asked to evaluate both paintings, and then to indicate which painting they
preferred. This measure was not actually scored or analyzed in any way, but the activity was
alleged later during the experimental session to be the basis for participants’ group assignment
(see below).
Informed Consent. All participants were given an informed consent form (see
Appendix B), and the researcher helped to guide them through the informed consent process.
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Importantly, the researcher stated that the experiment was about the influence of personality on
certain decision making tasks, that 1 in 10 participants would win an Amazon gift card, and that
the value of the card would depend on the decisions made during the investment and
decision-making activities. The researcher asked if the participants had any questions. If they
did not have any questions, they were asked to read the informed consent form and sign the form
if they wished to participate. Once the participants had signed the informed consent form, the
experimenter collected it and walked participants through the rest of the study.
Personal Norm of Reciprocity. The Personal Norm of Reciprocity (PNR) scale (Perugini
et al., 2003; see Appendix C) was the first questionnaire completed during the experimental
session by all participants. This survey was used to measure the degree to which the participants
had internalized the social norms of reciprocity. This scale consists of 27 items with three
subscales measuring beliefs in reciprocity, adherence to positive reciprocity, and adherence to
negative reciprocity. The beliefs in reciprocity subscale consists of statements such as, “If I
work hard, I expect it will be repaid.” The adherence to positive reciprocity subscale consists of
items such as “I am ready to undergo personal cost to help somebody who helped me before.”
The adherence to negative reciprocity sub-scale consists of items such as “If someone is unfair to
me, I prefer to give him/her what s/he deserves instead of accepting his/her apologies.” There
are nine items for each subscale. Participants were instructed to read each statement and to rate
the degree to which the statement seems true for them on a seven-point scale (1 = “not true for
me,” 7 = “true for me”). Scores for each subscale were constructed by averaging their respective
items.
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Mortality Salience. After completing the PNR scale, participants were assigned either to
a mortality salience condition or a mortality not salient (control) condition. Those in the
mortality salience condition spent 10 minutes responding to each of two prompts (see
Appendix D). The first was, “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own
death arouses in you.” The second prompt was, “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you
think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead.” Participants in
the control condition responded to similar prompts, but with regard to watching television. That
is, “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of watching television arouses in you,”
and “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think happens to you as you watch television
and once you have physically watched television.”
After responding to both prompts, participants engaged in two filler tasks. Specifically,
they were asked to complete the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule and to read a passage
from “The Growing Stone,” both of which are described in more detail in the paragraphs below.
The purpose of these filler tasks was to draw the participants’ attention away from the mortality
salience prime, and to allow enough time to pass for thoughts of death to fade from their sphere
of focused attention. This is consistent with the dual-process model of defense, which states that
mortality salience effects are only activated when death-related thoughts are accessible but not at
the forefront of one’s attention.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. The first filler task was the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; see Appendix E). This survey
consists of 20 items with two ten-item subscales (positive affect and negative affect). It asks
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participants to indicate their current mood on 5-point scales (1 = Very Slightly or Not at All,
5 = Extremely). Previous research has indicated that there is no relationship between mortality
salience and affect as measured by the PANAS (Greenburg et al., 1997).
Growing Stone. For the second filler task participants were instructed to read a passage
from “The Growing Stone,” which is a short story from the collection Exile and the Kingdom
(Camus, 1957; see Appendix F), and then to answer two simple questions about the passage.
Reading this passage is often used as a filler task after a mortality salience induction because of
its lack of death-related and affective references.
Group Induction. After completing the PANAS and answering questions about the
Growing Stone passage, participants were each given an envelope, the contents of which were
intended to remind them of the Painting Preferences Questionnaire they had completed online
when they first signed-up for the study (see Appendix G). They were told that this questionnaire
was used to identify their artistic preferences according to the types of paintings that they
preferred. Additionally, they were told that these painting preferences are associated with a
specific dimension of personality, that people tend to fall into one of two opposing categories on
this aspect of personality, and that for the purposes of this study these categories had been
labeled as “Shapes” and “Colors.” Further, participants were informed that in order to maintain
anonymity, they had been assigned an alias in accordance with their group membership (i.e.,
someone who was in the “Shapes” group might be assigned the alias “Triangle,” while someone
in the “Colors” group might be assigned the alias “Purple”). All participants in this study were
assigned to the “Colors” group, assigned the alias “Orange,” and asked to remember both their
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group name and alias. Thus, the researcher instructed them to hold on to the sheet of paper that
contains their group membership and alias, because they would be asked to report this
information in subsequent tasks. This naming convention was used in order to help participants
easily keep track of who was in their in-group and who was in their out-group, while avoiding
the potential confounds that are associated with names (Zurn & Topolinski, 2017) and gender
(Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008).
Trust Game & Ultimatum Game. After the experimenter completed the group induction,
participants were informed that they would complete two additional tasks, the trust game and the
ultimatum game (to participants, the trust game was always referred to as the “Investment
Activity” while the ultimatum game was always referred to as the “Decision-Making Activity.”
Here, however, they will simply be referred to as the trust game and the ultimatum game.) They
were informed that both of these tasks required two individuals, and that these tasks had
allegedly been started by other students who had participated in this same study but at earlier
points in time. In the instructions for both, participants were advised to make wise decisions,
because 1 in 10 participants would be randomly selected to receive an Amazon gift card, and the
dollar amount of that card would be the same as the dollar amount that the selected participants
ended up with at the ended of either the trust game or the ultimatum game. Which activity (trust
game or ultimatum game) would determine the dollar amount of the gift card would be chosen
by a coin flip. Additionally, they were told that after all of the data for the study had been
collected, they would be notified via e-mail about whether or not they had been selected to win a
gift card.
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The trust game involved two players, Player 1, the “Investor,” and Player 2, the “Fund
Manager.” The researcher explained the details of the trust game to participants, and that they
had all been assigned to the role of Player 2 (due to the timing of the session), and then instructed
them to open an envelope labelled “investment activity” (see Appendix H). It contained a
partially completed worksheet where the parts for Player 1 had already been filled in. From that
worksheet, the participant was able to see the group membership of Player 1, and that Player 1
had been aware of whether Player 2 would be an ingroup member or an outgroup member.
Player 1 appeared to have been given an endowment of $10, and to have been invited to
contribute whatever portion of that endowment he/she wished to an investment fund that was
guaranteed to triple in value, keeping the rest for him/herself. Player 2 was also able to see how
much Player 1 had contributed to the general fund. Player 1 contributed either the entire
endowment ($10) or a smaller portion of the endowment ($4) to that fund. Therefore, the
resultant fund size was always either $30 ($10 x 3) or $12 ($4 x 3).
Next, Player 2 (the participant) was asked to complete the rest of the worksheet in the
role of the Fund Manager (Player 2). Therefore, he/she needed to decide how much (if any) of
the $30 or $12 he/she would return to Player 1, keeping the remainder for him/herself.
Participants were reminded that each pair of Players would have a 1-in-10 chance of winning an
Amazon gift card in the amount that they walked away with at the end of either that activity or
the one to follow. When all participants in the session had completed the trust game, they were
instructed to set aside all of the trust game materials, and the experimenter began the process of
guiding them through the next task.
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In the case where the participants in a session completed the trust game first, they were
next given instructions for how to complete the ultimatum game (while participants who had
completed the ultimatum game first were next given instructions on how to complete the trust
game). Similar to the trust game, the ultimatum game involved two players, Player 1, the
“Proposer” and Player 2, the “Responder.” However, participants were told that they would be
paired with a different person than they had been paired with for the trust game. The researcher
explained to participants the details of the ultimatum game and that they had all been assigned to
the role of Responder (due to the timing of the session), and then instructed them to open an
envelope that was labelled “decision-making activity” (see Appendix I). It contained a partially
completed worksheet where the parts for the Proposer had already been filled in. From that
worksheet, the participant was able to see the group membership of the Proposer, and that the
Proposer had been aware of whether the Responder would be an ingroup member or an outgroup
member. From the information the Proposer provided, the participant could also see that that this
was a different person than the one they had been paired with in the trust game. At the start of
play, the Proposer appeared to have been given an endowment of $20, and had decided how to
divide that endowment between themselves and the Responder. Responders were able to see that
the proposer had proposed either a 50/50 split (i.e., the Proposer and the Responder both received
$10) or a 60/40 split (i.e., the Proposer received $12 and the Responder received $8).
Next, participants were asked to complete the worksheet in the role of the Responder.
Therefore, they had to decide whether to accept or reject the Proposer’s offer. Participants were
reminded that if they accepted the offer, then they and the Proposer would each have a 1-in-10
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chance of winning an Amazon gift card in the amount that had been proposed 1. However, if the
participant rejected the offer, then neither player would receive anything.
When all participants in the session had completed the worksheet, the researcher
instructed them to set aside all of the activity materials.
Exit Questionnaire & Manipulation Checks. After completing of both the trust game
and the ultimatum game, participants completed an exit questionnaire (see Appendix J). That
questionnaire solicited basic demographic information. It also contained manipulation checks
that were intended to discern the degree to which the participants felt an affinity for the painting
preferences group that they had been placed into. It also gave them the opportunity to guess the
hypotheses of the study. After completing the questionnaire, participants were thanked for their
participation, partially debriefed, told that they would be fully debriefed via e-mail once all the
data had been collected, and reminded that the debriefing e-mail would state whether or not they
had been awarded an Amazon gift card.
Debriefing. After all the data had been collected, debriefing statements were distributed
to all participants via e-mail (see Appendix K). Those who had won an Amazon gift card found
an electronic version of the gift card attached to the debriefing e-mail.

1

Participants actually had a 1-in-20 chance of winning the amount that they walked away with at
the end of the end of the ultimatum game as well as a 1-in-20 chance of winning the amount that
they walked away with at the end of the trust game. This adds up to a 1-in-10 chance of winning
some amount of money in the form of an Amazon gift card.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
A key assumption of this study is that in the trust and ultimatum games participants
believed that real money could potentially be at stake (which it was), that their interaction
partners were real (when they were not), and that the decisions they made during the course of
the study could potentially affect their own and their interaction partner’s outcomes. If
participants believed that they were not interacting with a real person, but that real money was
nevertheless at stake, then they should not have returned any money in the trust game, and
should have chosen to accept whatever amount had been offered to them in the ultimatum game.
Only 0.78% (3 out of 384) did both. While there were several participants who chose to not
return anything in the trust game (5 out of 384), two of them also chose to reject the proposer’s
offer in the Ultimatum Game (with one of them having been paired with an unfair ultimatum
partner and the other with a fair ultimatum partner). This seems to indicate that something else
was influencing their decision-making processes (e.g., generalized hostility, spitefulness, etc.)
rather than disbelief, and that most participants either believed that they were interacting with
another real person who had participated in this same study at an earlier point in time, or were
not confident enough in their disbelief to act accordingly.
One of the items included in the exit questionnaire assessed the effectiveness of the group
categorization manipulation. Specifically, this question was open-ended and asked, “Which
50
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personality group did you belong to?” Overall, only 6 participants out of the original 422
responded to this question incorrectly. This suggest that the group membership manipulation
worked at least to the degree that participants were able to name the group that they had been
assigned to. Also, as stated before, the data from those 6 participants was not included in the
final data set.
To discern the degree to which participants may have guessed the hypotheses, and to give
them the opportunity to express their suspicions about the study, I included an open-ended item
in the exit questionnaire that asked them to state their best guess regarding the purpose of the
study. All participants wrote a response to this question. The largest number of participants (155,
40.4%) either admitted that they did not know the purpose of the study or were completely off
base in their guesses. The next highest category was participants who guessed that the study had
something to do with personality and decision-making (82, 21.4%). However, this was also part
of the cover story. None were able to completely guess any of the hypotheses or identify the
other important elements of this study (e.g., the impact of mortality salience, group membership,
etc.). Seventy-nine participants (20.6%) guessed that the experiment had something to do with
reciprocity, generosity, retaliation, or morality, but did not describe anything close to the
hypothesized relationships between reciprocity, group membership, and mortality salience.
Thirty-two (8.3%) guessed that the experiment had something to do with mood/emotion.
Twenty-two (5.7%) guessed that study had something to do with interacting with people who
were similar to versus different from them. Nine (2.3%) guessed that the experiment had
something to do with death. Five (1.3%) said that the experiment had something to with
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responding to anonymous strangers who were not seen. However, none specifically stated doubts
regarding whether their interaction partners were real people, and none came close to guessing
the hypotheses.
Reliability & Validity
Personal Norm of Reciprocity. The Personal Norm of Reciprocity (PNR) scale
consisted of 27 items with three subscales (measuring beliefs in reciprocity, adherence to the
norms of positive reciprocity, and adherence to the norms of negative reciprocity). Consistent
with previous findings (Perugini et al., 2003), the beliefs in reciprocity subscale fell just short of
acceptable reliability (Chronbach’s α = 0.69). The primary reason for this is that this scale
contains questions about how efficient and widespread both positive and negative reciprocity
norms are. However, there were no hypotheses related to this scale for this study therefore it was
not analyzed further. As anticipated, the measures of adherence to the norm of positive
reciprocity (Chronbach’s α = 0.76) and negative reciprocity (Chronbach’s α = 0.89) both had
acceptable reliability.
Given that the sample size is relatively large (with 384 cases), formal methods of
assessing distributional normality, such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Lilliefors test,
are likely to result in significant p-values even if the deviations from normality are small
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Therefore, I used frequency histograms (with a superimposed
normal curve) to visually assess the normality of the distributions for the measures of adherence
to the norms of positive and negative norms of reciprocity (see Figures 2 and Figure 3
respectively). Both histograms suggest that these data are slightly—but not excessively—
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skewed. The distribution for the measures of adherence to the norm of positive reciprocity is
negatively skewed, while the distribution for the measure of adherence to the norm of negative
reciprocity is positively skewed. Given the robustness of the statistical test that were run, these
slight deviations from normality are unlikely to have substantial effects on the statistical
outcomes.
Figure 2. Distribution of mean scores from the PNR positive reciprocity subscale.
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Figure 3. Distribution of mean scores from the PNR negative reciprocity subscale.

Test of the Hypotheses
This laboratory study tested the degree to which mortality salience, group membership,
partner behavior, and individual differences in adherence to the personal norms of reciprocity
impact both positive and negative reciprocity behavior. Hypotheses related to positive and
negative reciprocity are distinct from one another and were treated separately as described
below.
Results for Positive Reciprocity. Hypotheses related to positive reciprocity were tested
within the context of a 2 (mortality salience: salient vs. not salient) x 2 (group membership:
ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (partner behavior: stingy vs. generous) between-subjects experimental
design, with participants’ behavior in the trust game as the dependent variable. The order in
which participants engaged in the trust and ultimatum games was counterbalanced. Further, for
participants who encountered the trust game second, just as many of them had previously been
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paired with an unfair ultimatum game partner as with a fair ultimatum game partner.
Nevertheless, I tested for order effects and for the effect of the ultimatum game partner’s
behavior by conducting a preliminary 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), where
the additional two factors were the order of the games (trust game first vs. ultimatum game first)
and what the partner’s behavior in the ultimatum game had been /would be (fair vs. unfair) . No
main or interaction effects involving order were found. Additionally, there were no main or
interaction effects involving the partner’s behavior in the ultimatum game. Finally, there was not
an interaction between order and partner’s behavior in the ultimatum game, and none of the
higher order effects involving this two-way interaction were significant either. Therefore, order
and partner’s behavior in the ultimatum game are not considered further.
The mean percentages of the general fund that participants, returned to Player 1 in the
trust game within the various conditions of the experiment are shown in Table 3. Although it was
not part of the original design or hypotheses, adherence to the norm of positive reciprocity was
also measured and was included in a supplementary analysis, which is why it is also included in
Table 3.

50.00
(13.89)

46.88
(15.44)

High
PNR-P

All
PNR-P

50.52
(17.56)

51.67
(13.81)

49.28
(21.16)

Outgroup

46.67
(18.26)

48.83
(18.36)

45.12
(18.36)

Ingroup

50.90
(18.19)

52.59
(19.02)

48.73
(17.27)

Outgroup

Generous Player 1

45.83
(16.67)

50.88
(17.32)

42.53
(15.65)

Ingroup

46.70
(18.25)

45.61
(16.05)

47.41
(19.81)

Outgroup

Stingy Player 1

53.61
(9.77)

54.72
(9.27)

52.50
(10.32)

Ingroup

52.88
(14.40)

57.08
(13.59)

49.88
(14.44)

Outgroup

Generous Player 1

Mortality Not Salient

Note: PNR-P refers to adherence to the norm of positive reciprocity. For this table, Low and high PNR-P were determined
by median split. However, this variable was statistically analyzed as a continuous variable. Standard deviations are
in parentheses.

44.83
(16.23)

Low
PNR-P

Ingroup

Stingy Player 1

Mortality Salient

Table 3. Means & standard deviations for the percentage of the general fund returned to Player 1 in the trust game.
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I used a frequency histogram to visually assess the normality of the distribution of the percentage
of the general fund returned in the trust game (see Figure 4). Although the data appear to be
approximately symmetrically distributed, it is important to note the high number of participants
who chose to return exact 50% of the general fund.
Figure 4. Percentage of the general fund returned to Player 1 in the trust game across all
experimental conditions.

The hypothesized relationships between the predictors and the outcome variable were all
listed in Table 1. To test these hypotheses, I ran a 2 (mortality salience: salient vs. not salient) x
2 (group membership: in-group vs. out-group) x 2 (partner behavior: stingy vs. generous)
between-subjects ANOVA on the percentage of the general fund that participants returned to
Player 1 (see Table 4).
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Table 4. Results of the 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA for the percentage of the general fund returned to
Player 1 in the Trust Game.
Predictor
Mortality Salience (MS)
Group Membership (GM)
Partner Behavior (B)
MS x GM
MS x B
GM x B
MS x GM x B
Error

Sum of Squares
99.02
386.00
1198.27
359.73
1140.11
6.08
28.71
99862.79

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
376

Mean Square
99.02
386.00
1198.27
359.73
1140.11
6.08
28.71
265.59

F
.37
1.45
4.51
1.35
4.29
.02
.11

p
.54
.23
.03
.25
.04
.88
.74

Hypothesis P1: Partner Behavior. Hypotheses P1 predicted a significant main effect of
partner behavior, such that participants will return a greater percentage of the general fund to a
generous Player 1 in comparison to a stingy Player 1. In support of this first hypothesis, the
analysis revealed that there was indeed a significant main effect of partner behavior; F (1, 376) =
4.51, p = .03. Participants who were paired with a stingy Player 1 returned a smaller percentage
of the general fund (M = 47.48, SD = 16.97) in comparison to participants who were paired with
a generous Player 1 (M = 51.02, SD = 15.66). Thus, Hypothesis P1 was supported.
Hypothesis P2: Partner Behavior x Mortality Salience. Hypothesis P2 predicted a
significant partner-behavior-by-mortality-salience interaction, such that participants will return a
smaller portion of the general fund to a stingy Player 1 when they had been primed with
mortality salience in comparison to when they had received the control prime (mortality not
salient). By contrast, I expected participants to return similar amounts of the general fund to a
generous Player 1, regardless of whether or not they had been primed with mortality salience.
The analysis did reveal a 2-way interaction between partner behavior and mortality salience; F
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(1, 376) = 4.29, p = .04. However, the pattern of means is opposite to what I predicted (see
Figure 5). In order to further examine this interaction, I conducted a series of t-tests, using
Tukey’s correction to control the experiment-wise error rate. Contrary to the predictions of

Hypothesis P2, there was not a significant difference in the amount that participants returned to a
stingy Player 1 in the mortality salient condition (M = 48.70, SD = 16.55) in comparison to the
mortality not salient condition (M = 46.27, SD = 17.39); t(190) = 1.03, p = .73. Nor was there a
significant difference in the amount that participants returned to the generous Player 1 in the
mortality salient condition (M = 48.78, SD = 18.25) in comparison to the mortality not salient
condition (M = 53.25, SD = 12.25); t(190) = 1.90, p = .23. However, for participants who had not
been primed with mortality salience, there was a relationship between partner behavior and the
amount returned; t(190) = 2.97, p = .02. Specifically, participants who had not been primed with
mortality salience and who had been paired with a stingy Player 1 (M = 46.27, SD = 17.39)
returned less than participants who had not been primed with mortality salience and had been
paired with a generous Player 1 (M = 53.25, SD = 12.25). By contrast, this difference did not
occur when mortality salience was primed; t(190) = .04, p = .999, meaning that participants who
had been primed with mortality salience returned about the same amount to a stingy Player 1
(M = 48.70, SD = 16.55) as they did to a generous Player 1 (M = 48.78, SD = 18.25). Thus,
hypothesis P2 is not supported.
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Figure 5. The mean percentage of the general fund that participants returned to Player 1 in the
Trust Game, broken down by partner behavior and mortality salience.

Percentage Returned (TG)

56
54

Mortality Not Salient

52

Mortality Salient

50
48
46
44
42
40

Stingy Player 1

Generous Player 1

Note: The error bars represent one standard error.
Even though there were no statistically significant order effects (as stated previously), I
wanted to visually inspect the data to see what they look like when separated by order. Although
the 3-way interaction between mortality salience, partner’s behavior in the trust game, and order
was not significant F (1, 352) = 1.11, p = .29, when I split the file by order and reran the 2
(mortality salience: salient vs. not salient) x 2 (group membership: in-group vs. out-group) x 2
(partner behavior: stingy vs. generous) between-subjects ANOVA on the percentage of the
general fund that participants returned to Player 1, it appears that both the main effect of partner
behavior and the two-way interaction between mortality salience and partner behavior occurs
only when the Trust Game is played second (see Figure 6). Specifically, when the trust game is
played first there is not a main effect of partner behavior, F (1, 184) = 0.10, p = .76, nor is there a
two-way interaction between mortality salience and partner behavior F (1, 184) = 0.49, p = .49.
However, when the trust game is played second, there is both a main effect of partner behavior,
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F (1, 184) = 7.68, p < .01, and an interaction between mortality salience and partner behavior
F (1, 184) = 5.22, p = .02. When participants played the trust game second, where in the
mortality salience condition, and were paired with generous partner, they returned 55.97% of the
general fund, which (according to a one-sample t-test) is significantly greater than 50% of the
endowment, t (1, 47) = 3.51, p < .01. I speculate on why this may have occurred in the discussion
section.
Figure 6. The mean percentage of the general fund that participants returned to Player 1 in the
Trust Game, broken down by partner behavior, mortality salience, and order.

Percentage Returned (TG)

58
56

Mortality Not Salient

54

Mortality Salient

52
50
48
46
44
42
40

Stingy

Generous

Trust Game First

Stingy

Generous

Trust Game Second

Hypothesis P3: Partner Behavior x Group Membership. Hypothesis P3 predicted that
there will be a significant partner-behavior–by-group-membership interaction, such that
participants will return a smaller portion of the general fund to stingy ingroup members in
comparison to stingy outgroup members, but will return similar amounts (proportions of the
general fund that are not significantly different from one another) to a generous Player 1
regardless of group membership. However, the analysis revealed that the 2-way interaction
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between partner behavior and group membership was not significant; F (1, 376) = 1.35, p = .25.
Therefore, I did not find support for this hypothesis.
Hypothesis P4: Partner Behavior x Group Membership x Mortality Salience.
Hypothesis P4 predicted that there will be a 3-way interaction between partner behavior, group
membership, and mortality salience. Specifically, I expected that the two-way interaction
between partner behavior and group membership described in hypothesis P3 will be significantly
greater in the mortality salience condition in comparison to the mortality not salient condition.
In particular, I expected that participants in the mortality salient condition would return a smaller
percentage of the general fund to stingy ingroup members in comparison to participants in any of
the other conditions. However, the analysis revealed that the 3-way interaction between partner
behavior, group membership, and mortality salience was not significant; F (1, 376) = 0.11,
p = .74. Therefore, I did not find support for this hypothesis.
Exploratory Analysis. As an exploratory analysis to see if participants’ score on the
positive reciprocity subscale predicted the amount they returned in the trust game, I conducted a
regression analysis that included the following predictors: adherence to the norm of positive
reciprocity (mean centered), mortality salience (salient = 1 vs. not salient = -1), group
membership (ingroup = 1 vs. outgroup = -1), partner behavior (stingy = 1 vs. generous = -1), and
all the interactions between these variables. The analysis replicated the results of the ANOVA,
meaning that there was still a main effect of partner behavior and an interaction between partner
behavior and mortality salience. In addition, this analysis also revealed a significant relationship
between scores on the PNR positive reciprocity subscale and the amount that participants
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returned in the trust game; B = 2.72, t (368) = 2.45, p = .02. Specifically, participants who
reported greater adherence to the norm of positive reciprocity returned more of the general fund
overall. However, none of the interactions involving the PNR positive reciprocity subscale were
significant. Thus, the effects reported above for Hypotheses P1 through P4 are independent of
the degree to which participants adhere to the norm of positive reciprocity.
Results for Negative Reciprocity. Hypotheses related to negative reciprocity were tested
within the context of a 2 (mortality salience: salient vs. not salient) x 2 (group membership:
ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (partner behavior: stingy vs. generous) between-subjects experimental
design, with participants’ behavior in the ultimatum game as the dependent variable. Adherence
to the norm of negative reciprocity was also measured and statistically analyzed in the context of
these other factors (i.e., mortality salience, group membership, and partner behavior). The order
in which participants engaged in the trust and ultimatum games was counter balanced. Further,
for participants who encountered the ultimatum game second, just as many had previously been
paired with a stingy trust game partner as had been previously paired with a generous trust game
partner. Nevertheless, I tested for order effects and for the effect of the trust game partner’s
behavior by conducting a preliminary sequential binary logistic regression, with mortality
salience (salient = 1 vs. not salient = -1), group membership (ingroup = 1 vs. outgroup = -1),
ultimatum game partner behavior (unfair = 1 vs. fair = -1), adherence to the norm of negative
reciprocity (mean centered), order (trust game first = 1 vs. ultimatum game first = -1), trust game
partner behavior (stingy = 1 vs. generous = -1), and all their interactions as predictors, and the
participants’ decision to accept or reject the proposal they received in the ultimatum game
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(accept = 0, reject = 1) as the outcome variable. No main or interaction effects involving order
were found. Additionally, no main or interaction effects of partner’s behavior in the trust game
were found. Finally, there was not an interaction between order and partner’s behavior in the
trust game, and none of the higher order effects involving this two-way interaction were
significant either. Therefore, order and partner’s behavior in the trust game are not considered
further.
The number of participants who chose to accept and reject Player 1’s offer in the
ultimatum game within the various conditions of the experiment are displayed in Table 5. The
hypothesized relationships between the predictors and the outcome variable were all listed in
Table 2.
To test these hypotheses, I conducted a sequential 1binary logistic regression using the
same predictors as above (excluding order, partner’s behavior in the trust game, and all
interaction terms involving these variables), where the four main effects were entered
simultaneously in Step 1, all of the two-way interactions were entered simultaneously in Step 2,
all of the 3-way interactions were entered simultaneously in Step 3, and the four-way interaction
was entered at Step 4.

1

I first conducted a simultaneous binary logistic regression similar to that described here. A test
of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, χ 2(15) = 86.91, p <
.001, indicating that these predictors as a set, significantly distinguished between participants
who were likely to accept vs. reject Player1’s offer in the ultimatum game. However, the
individual effects in this model were all uninterpretable; their standard errors were unrealistically
large and none were statistically significant. This was probably due the large number of cells that
had frequencies less than 5 (see Table 5).

17
[9]

34
[14]

High
PNR-N

All
PNR

33
[15]

21
[11]

12
[4]

Outgroup

48
[0]

19
[0]

29
[0]

Ingroup

46
[2]

16
[2]

30
[0]

Outgroup

Fair Player 1

41
[7]

17
[3]

24
[4]

Ingroup

35
[13]

12
[7]

23
[6]

Outgroup

Unfair Player 1

48
[0]

32
[0]

16
[0]

Ingroup

48
[0]

22
[0]

26
[0]

Outgroup

Fair Player 1

Mortality Not Salient

Note: PNR-N refers to adherence to the norm of negative reciprocity. For this table, high and low PNR were determined by
median split. However, this variable was statistically analyzed as a continuous variable.

17
[5]

Low
PNR-N

Ingroup

Unfair Player 1

Mortality Salient

Table 5. Number of participants who accepted and rejected (in brackets) Player 1’s offer in each experimental condition
of the Ultimatum Game.
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Table 6 shows the resulting regression coefficients, Wald statistics, and p-values for all
predictors in of the model. As a group, the 4 main effects entered in Step 1 of the model were
statistically significant; χ2(4) = 71.63, p < .001, with the individual coefficients for two of these
effects also being significant (discussed in more detail below). Step 2 of the analysis, which
added the two-way interactions, did not result in a significant χ2 change, and none of the two-way
interactions were individually significant. Step 3 of the analysis which add the three-way
interactions, also did not result in a χ2 change that was significantly different from either Step 1
or Step 2. Therefore, the unpredicted significant 3-way interaction between mortality salience,
group membership, and adherence to the norm of negative reciprocity seen in Table 6 is not
examined further. Finally, Step 4 (the four-way interaction), also did not result in a significant χ 2
change. Thus, this pattern of results suggests that the majority of the predictive power of the
model is due to the main effects of partner behavior and adherence to the norm of negative
reciprocity.
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Table 6. The step-wise model that only includes main effects.
Predictors

B

SE

Wald

df

p

.17
.167
.37
.14

2.64
2.08
23.24
5.753

1
1
1
1

.10
.15
.00
.02

.000
.000
.000
2.692
1.165
.000
.302
.000
.009
1.837

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.994
.994
.990
.101
.280
.994
.582
.994
.923
.175

Step 1
Mortality Salience (MS)
Group Membership (GM)
Partner Behavior (B)
PNR-N

.27
-.24
1.77
.33

Mortality Salience (MS)
Group Membership (GM)
Behavior (B)
PNR-N
MS x GM
MS x B
MS x PNR-N
GM x B
GM x PNR-N
B x PNR-N

5.613
-4.945
12.569
1.646
.188
-5.352
-.078
4.722
-.014
-1.358

Step 2
697.123
668.302
965.720
1.003
.174
697.123
.142
668.302
.142
1.002

Note: PNR-N refers to the adherence to the norm of negative reciprocity. Table continued on
next page.
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Predictors

B

SE

Wald

df

p

Step 3
Mortality Salience (MS)
Group Membership (GM)
Partner Behavior (B)
NegRec
MS x GM
MS x B
MS x NegRec
GM x B
GM x NegRec
B x NegRec
MS x GM x B
MS x GM x NegRec
MS x B x NegRec
GM x B x NegRec

2.222
-2.184
8.461
.474
-1.888
-1.962
.655
1.947
-.614
-.223
2.028
.306
-.698
.582

2052.268
1984.725
1198.269
1265.964
2351.231
2052.268
909.383
1984.725
1051.684
1265.964
2351.231
.148
909.383
1051.684

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
4.275
.000
.000

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.999
.999
.994
1.00
.999
.999
.999
.999
1.00
1.00
.999
.039
.999
1.00

Mortality Salience (MS)
Group Membership (GM)
Partner Behavior (B)
NegRec
MS x GM
MS x B
MS x NegRec
GM x B
GM x NegRec
B x NegRec
MS x GM x B
MS x GM x NegRec
MS x B x NegRec
GM x B x NegRec
MS x GM x B x Neg Rec

2.052
-2.040
8.112
.493
-1.852
-1.792
.346
1.804
-.383
-.242
1.992
-.214
-.389
.352
.521

1285.281
1285.281
1285.281
1041.757
1285.281
1285.281
1041.757
1285.281
1041.757
1041.757
1285.281
1041.757
1041.757
1041.757
1041.757

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.999
.999
.995
1.00
.999
.999
1.00
.999
1.00
1.00
.999
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Step 4
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Hypothesis N1: Partner Behavior. Hypothesis N1 predicted a significant main effect of
partner behavior, such that participants will be more likely to reject an unfair proposal than a fair
proposal. The sequential binary logistic regression analysis revealed that there was a significant
main effect of partner behavior; B = 1.77, Wald χ2 = 23.24, p <.001. This suggest that
participants were indeed more likely to reject an unfair offer than a fair offer. Therefore, this
hypothesis is supported.
Hypothesis N2: Partner Behavior x Norm Adherence. Hypothesis N2 predicted a
significant partner-behavior-by-norm-adherence interaction, whereby participants who strongly
adhere to the norm of negative reciprocity will be more likely to reject marginally unfair offers
than participants who weakly adhere to the norm of negative reciprocity, but participants who
received a fair offer would reject offers at a similar rate regardless of whether they strongly or
weakly adhere to the norm of negative reciprocity. However, the analysis revealed that there was
not a significant 2-way interaction between behavior and norm adherence; B = -1.36, Wald χ2 =
1.84, p = .18. Instead, there was only a main effect for norm adherence, such that participants
who more strongly adhered to the norm of negative reciprocity were overall more likely to reject
whatever offer was made; B = .33, Wald χ2 = 5.75, p = .02. Therefore, I did not find support for
this hypothesis.
Hypothesis N3: Partner Behavior x Mortality Salience. Hypotheses N3 predicted a
significant partner-behavior-by-mortality-salience interaction, whereby participants in the
mortality salient condition will be more likely to reject marginally unfair offers than participant
in the mortality not salient condition, but participants who receive fair offers will reject at a
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similar rate regardless of whether or not they have been primed with mortality salience.
However, the analysis revealed that there was not a significant 2-way interaction between partner
behavior and mortality salience; B = -5.36, Wald χ2 = .00, p = .99 Therefore, I did not find
support for this hypothesis.
Hypothesis N4: Partner Behavior x Mortality Salience x Norm Adherence. Hypothesis
N4 predicted that there will be a 3-way interaction between partner behavior, mortality salience,
and norm adherence. Specifically, I expect that the two-way interaction between partner behavior
and norm adherence described in Hypothesis N2 to be significantly stronger in the mortality
salience condition in comparison to the mortality not salient condition. In particular, I expect
that participants who strongly adhere to the norm of negative reciprocity and had been primed
with mortality salience will be more likely to reject marginally unfair offers than participants in
any of the other conditions. But the analysis revealed that there was not a significant 3-way
interactions between partner behavior, mortality salience, and norm adherence; B = -.70, Wald χ2
= .00, p = 1. Therefore, I did not find support for this hypothesis.
Hypothesis N5: Group Membership x Partner Behavior. Hypothesis N5 predicted that
there will be a significant interaction between group membership and partner behavior, whereby
participants will be more likely to reject marginally unfair offers from ingroup members than
outgroup members, but will reject fair offers at about the same rate regardless of the group
membership of the proposer. But the analysis revealed that there was not a significant 2-way
interaction between group membership and partner behavior; B = 4.72, Wald χ2 = .00, p = .99.
Therefore, I did not find support for this hypothesis.
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Hypothesis N6: Group Membership x Partner Behavior x Mortality Salience.
Hypothesis N6 predicted that there will be a 3-way interaction between group membership,
partner behavior, and mortality salience. Specifically, I expected the two-way interaction
between group membership and partner behavior predicted in Hypothesis N5 to be greater in the
mortality salience condition in comparison to the mortality not salient condition. In particular, I
expected that participants who had been primed with mortality salience and received a
marginally unfair offer from an ingroup member would be more likely to reject the proposal than
participants in any other condition. However, the analysis revealed that there was not a
significant 3-way interaction between group membership, partner behavior, and mortality
salience; B = 2.03, Wald χ2 = .00, p = 1. Therefore, I did not find support for this hypothesis
Hypothesis N7: Group Membership x Partner Behavior x Norm Adherence. Finally,
Hypothesis N7 predicted that there will be a significant 3-way interaction between group
membership, partner behavior, and adherence to the norm of negative reciprocity. Specifically, I
expected that the two-way interaction between partner behavior and adherence to the norm of
negative reciprocity described in Hypothesis N2 to be greater in the ingroup condition than the
outgroup condition. In particular, I expected that participants who strongly adhere to the norm of
negative reciprocity and had received an unfair offer from an ingroup member would be more
likely to reject the proposal in comparison to participants in any of the other conditions. But the
analysis revealed that there was not significant 3-way interaction between group membership,
partner behavior, and adherence to the norm of negative reciprocity; B = .58, Wald χ = .00, p = 1.
Therefore, I did not find support for this hypothesis.
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Exploratory Analysis. Although the sequential binary logistic regression is more
interpretable than the simultaneous binary logistic regression mentioned in the third footnote of
this paper, the results for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th steps of this analysis are still unwieldly, in that
standard errors for these steps are also unrealistically large. This is likely due to same reasons
that the simultaneous binary logistic regression was uninterpretable. That is, the large number of
cells that had frequencies less than 5. Therefore, I conducted an exploratory analysis to see if
eliminating the adherence to the negative norm of reciprocity variable would yield different
results. I re-ran the binary logistic regression but without this variable and all of the interactions
that were associated with it. With the exception of the main effect of adherence to the norm of
negative reciprocity (because it was removed), all other results came out the same. That is, there
was a significant main effect of partner behavior, the only step in the analysis that was
significantly different from the null model was the first step, and none of the other individual
main or interactions effects were significant.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
This study investigated the effects of mortality salience (salient vs. not salient), group
membership (ingroup vs. outgroup), partner’s behavior (stingy vs. generous), and adherence to
the norms of positive and negative reciprocity on behavioral reciprocity. Participants completed
either a mortality salience or control (where mortality was not salient) induction, a group
membership induction, a personal norms of reciprocity scale, one round of a single-shot trust
game (to measure positive reciprocity), and one round of a single-shot ultimatum game (to
measure negative reciprocity).
During the trust game, an ostensible interaction partner received a small monetary
endowment, and contributed either that entire endowment or less than half of it (keeping the rest
for him/herself) to a general fund that was guaranteed to triple in value before being transferred
to the participant. The participant’s task was then to determine how much of the general fund to
return to the interaction partner, keeping the rest for him/herself. The amount returned served as
a measure of positive reciprocity, with larger returns reflecting more positive reciprocity. I found
that participants’ decisions about what proportion of the general fund to return to Player 1 were
affected by both the behavior of Player 1 and whether or not they had been primed with mortality
salience. Specifically, when participants were not primed with mortality salience they returned
more of the general fund when they were paired with a generous Player 1 than when they were
paired with a stingy Player 1. This finding is consistent with the trust game literature, having not
73
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ever before included a mortality salience prime, and generally finds that participants return a
higher percentage of the general fund to more generous Player 1s (Berg, et al. 1995; Johnson &
Mislin, 2011).
Additionally, I found a positive relationship between the degree to which participants
adhered to the norm of positive reciprocity and how much they returned to Player 1. Specifically,
participants with higher scores on the positive reciprocity PNR subscale, on average returned
more money to Player 1, and did not interact with other factors. This finding suggests that
reciprocity is affected by the participant’s adherence to their own personal norm of positive
reciprocity regardless of mortality salience, group membership, or Player 1’s behavior. This
pattern of results is unexpected due to the contingent nature of reciprocity. Given there was not
an interaction between the positive reciprocity and partner behavior, this pattern of results
suggests that the positive reciprocity PNR subscale may be measuring some other construct
entirely that is more fixed in nature (e.g., agreeableness, generosity, etc.). Systematically,
exploring the other traits that could be associated with the tendency to adhere to the norm of
positive reciprocity is another important area for future study.
Consistent with the findings of Pillutla et al. (2003), and from those in the original trust
game study by Berg et al. (1995), I found a positive relationship between the proportion of the
endowment that Player 1 initially contributed to the general fund and the proportion of the
general fund that the participants subsequently returned to Player 1 in the trust game. That is,
participants tended to return a larger amount when Player 1 contributed a larger portion of the
endowment to the general fund. However, the results from this study also deviate in a couple of
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key ways from the findings of Pillutla et al. (2003) and Berg et al. (1995). Specifically, in the
original trust game study, Berg et al. (1995) found that, on average, Player 2 returned about 30%
of the general fund. Similarly, under conditions where Player 1 had been endowed with $10 and
contributed half or more of the endowment to the general fund, Pillutla et al. (2003) also found
that Player 2 returned about 30% of the general fund. By contrast, in the present study, the
overall average returned was 49.25%, with participants returning 47.48% of the general fund to
the stingy Player 1 and 51.02% to the generous Player 1. Both values are significantly larger than
the amounts reported by Berg et al. (1995) and by Pillutla et al. (2003).
In the trust game, overall, the average amount returned to Player 1 hovered around 50%.
One reason for this outcome was that many participants chose simply to split the money exactly
in half. In the generous condition, 108 (56.30%) participants choose to split the money evenly,
and in the stingy condition 78 (40.60%) chose this option. Even in the generous condition, where
it might be expected that participants would return more to Player 1, a 50/50 split is not typical
for the trust game (Berg, et al. 1995; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Under similar conditions, Pillutla
et al. (2003) found that player 2 returned an average of only 35% of the general fund.
While the results presented here are different from studies that used the trust game as a
measure of positive reciprocity, it is not too surprising that many participants in the generous
condition decided to split the money evenly. Splitting the money even is a common heuristic for
obtaining fairness (equal outcomes), and in this case that would have worked out just the way
that participants may have expected it to, without them needing to exert additional mental effort.
However, in the stingy condition, I expected few participants to evenly split the money. This is
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because splitting the money meant that Player 1 would walk away with more money than them,
which is typically an outcome that individuals attempt to avoid (Pillutla et al, 2003). Because
Player 1 was initially given a $10 endowment, chose to keep $6 and to contribute only $4 to the
general fund (which was tripled, resulting in a general fund of $12), if participants decided to
evenly split the general fund, then Player 1 would have walked away with $12 (the $6 that they
kept, plus the $6 returned from the general fund), while the participant would have walked away
with only $6. Although fewer participants chose to evenly split the general fund in the stingy
condition than in the generous condition, a substantial number in the stingy condition
nevertheless did so.
I speculate that given the somewhat complicated nature of the task (the trust game), it’s
possible that many participants did not have fully understand what they were doing. Perhaps they
were distracted by other elements of the study, particularly if they encountered the trust game
first, because it would have meant that this was the first math-related task that they were
encountering in the study. It’s possible that they may have somehow forgotten that Player 1 had
already chosen to keep $6 from the initial endowment. Meaning that the $6 they would have
received from an even split of the general fund would result in Player 1 walking away with $12,
while they would walk away with only $6. Maybe modifying worksheet so that participants are
forced to calculate walk-away amounts would change the outcomes and cause participants to
think more strategically. Another option would be to run a similar study either online or via a
local area network, and to use trust game software that clearly states and updates the total
amount walk-away amounts for each partner in the interaction depending upon the decisions of
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the participant. Alternatively, maybe they were cognitively fatigued after having performed the
somewhat long list of tasks that came before this one. Therefore, they may have chosen to simply
split the money in half because it seemed easier than having to do the additional math to figure
out what would be a or more equitable amount. Prior trust game studies typically have not asked
participants to preform so many different types of tasks before engaging in the trust game.
Alternatively, participants may have felt that there was little at stake because they only had a 1 in
10 chance actually winning the money from either the trust game or the ultimatum game.
Further, this sample may simply not have been as motivated by money as others, perhaps
because many of these participants were already financially well-off.
Given that I am unsure of the reasons for the high return overall and the high number of
participants who chose to split the money (even if they had been paired with a stingy trust game
partner), it is difficult to say how this aspect of the study could be improved. If the reason is
cognitive fatigue, then I would recommend shortening the longest part of the study, which would
be the writing of the mortality salience essays. Perhaps outcomes would be different if
participants were asked to spend only 5 minutes on each essay instead of 10. However, I am
unsure if this would weaken the mortality salience prime. In previous mortality salience studies,
there has been a great deal of variability in the length of the essays participants were asked to
write. Most mortality salience studies do not report the length essay (in terms of word count),
nor do they record the amount of time that participants were given to write essays. However, for
the studies that did report this type of information, I found that the essays generated in one study
were not even half the length of the average essay generated in the current study, and I even
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found one study where participants were asked to answer the mortality salience prompts with
only one sentence. Therefore, further investigation is needed in order to determine if these
differences in procedure impact outcomes.
Although the average amount returned to Player 1 hovered around 50% in the trust game
this study, I also found that the amount returned was contingent upon whether or not they were in
the mortality salience condition. Specifically, I also found that when participants were primed
with mortality salience, they returned similar amounts to both a stingy and generous Player 1.
However, when they were not primed mortality salience, they returned more a generous Player 1
than to a Stingy Player 1. These findings suggest that mortality salience is influencing the typical
relationship between partner behavior (stingy or generous) and the amount returned. One
explanation for this is that previous research indicates that mortality salience motivates
individuals to strengthen the buffer between themselves and anxiety provoking death thoughts by
way of taking action that that protects one’s culturally constructed world view and/or promotes
positive self-esteem (Greenberg et al., 1994; Pyszcynski et al., 1999). One way of
accomplishing both is by adhering to salient norms and values (Schindler, 2013). Because of the
nature of the trust game, I originally assumed that positive reciprocity would be the most salient
norm, and mortality salience would prompt adherence to this norm; however, that does not
appear to have been the case. Instead it appears that in positive reciprocity was the most salient
norm when participants had not been primed with mortality salience and that perhaps mortality
salience activated adherence to different norms (other than reciprocity).
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One reason that the norm of reciprocity may not have been the most salient norm/value in
the mortality salient condition may have had something the most salient norms that mortality
salience may have prompted for this particular sample. Given that this study took place at one of
the largest Jesuit Catholic universities in America, the Jesuit values of forgiveness and
compassion may have taken precedence over the norm of reciprocity. Specifically, because
thoughts of death may have been more likely to promote thoughts that were more related to the
religion and therefore may have primed participants with the concepts of forgiveness and/or
compassion for Player 1, it may have had a substantial effect on the pattern of results that were
obtained in this study. Specifically, if mortality salience primed participants to feel more
forgiveness toward a stingy Player 1 (by way of religiosity), then it would account for why there
isn’t a statistically significant different between the amount returned to a generous Player 1 and
the amount returned to the stingy Player 1 in the mortality salient condition. An alternative
explanation for this phenomenon would be if mortality salience caused participants to show more
compassion towards Player 1, such that they were less like to interpret Player 1’s actions as
stingy (making it therefore not a situation that called for reciprocity), but rather gave Player 1 the
benefit of the doubt, by assuming that he/she withheld some of the funds because he/she really
needed the money. In turn, this may have prompted the participant to return more of the money
than if he/she had interpreted Player 1’s actions as stingy. How the individual in the position of
the second mover interpreting the actions the first mover (without having a way to communicate
with him/her) and the impact that this has on the amount returned is an important area of future
study.
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However, while the activation of the values of forgiveness and compassion may explain
why there is not a statistically significant difference between the amount returned to a generous
Player 1 and the amount returned to a stingy Player 1 when mortality is made salient, it does not
explain why participants in the mortality not salient condition on average returned significantly
more than 50% of the endowment to a generous Player 1. Also, it’s important to note that
although participants in the mortality salient condition on average returned less than 50% of the
endowment to a generous Player 1, the amount was not significantly less than 50%. In an attempt
to uncover the reason so this pattern of results, I speculated that it may have something to do
with order effects. Previous research has found that when participants play repeated trust games,
that both trust (as measured by the amount that Player 1 contributes to the general fund) and
reciprocity (as measured by the amount that Player 2 returns to Player 1) tend to erode over
time/multiple interactions, regardless of whether these interactions are with the same or different
partners (Ostrom & Walker, 2005).
Given this literature, although participants did not engage in a repeated trust game, they
did instead engaged in two different types of games with two different partners. Because I was
concerned that order effects might influence important outcomes of the study, I tested for order
effects. Although I did not find any statistically significant order effects for the trust game, upon
visually inspecting the data, it did appear that there was a different pattern of results for
participants who encountered the trust game as the first of the two games than for those who
encountered the trust game second. Specifically, it appears that the observed two-way interaction
between mortality salience and partner’s behavior only occurred when the trust game was played
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second. When the trust game was played first, it appears that participants returned approximately
50% of the endowment to Player 1 in all conditions. However, when playing the trust game as
the second game, participants in the mortality not salient condition returned significantly more to
a generous Player 1 than to a stingy Player 1, and indeed returned significantly more than 50% of
the general fund in the generous Player 1 condition.
Given that that the decision that participants were asked to make was binary in the
ultimatum game and continuous in the trust game, I speculate that participants probably found
the trust game to be the more complicated game. Especially when considering the additional
effort that would’ve been required to calculate and update what each person will walk away with
if Player 1 does not contribute the entire endowment to the general fund, and one is trying to
obtain equal outcomes. Participants may not have been prepared to think strategically about their
actions in the context this type of task. Therefore, they may have sought to simplify the task by
relying on general rules of thumb (e.g., evenly splitting whatever amount ended up in the general
fund, without taking the time to consider how much they would be walking away with in
comparison to the other person). By contrast, those who encountered the trust game second may
have been more likely to behave in a strategic manner, because they would have had the
experience of encountering the less complicated ultimatum first, thereby easing them into
thinking more strategically. Because encountering the trust game second may have seemed more
manageable, they may have felt less of a need to rely on heuristics, making them more likely to
employ strategy. When doing so, those in the mortality salient condition may have still relied on
the values/norms of forgiveness and compassion to guide their decisions, while those who have
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not been primed with mortality salience may have instead relied upon the norm of reciprocity to
make their decision. While this finding sheds some light on the pattern of results that I obtained,
it does not explain why participants in the mortality not salient condition who played the trust
game second on average returned significantly more than 50% of the endowment to a generous
Player 1.
In the ultimatum game, the ostensible interaction partner was given a $20 endowment by
the experimenter, and he/she proposed either an even $10/$10 split of that endowment with the
participant, or a $12/$8 split (in his/her own favor). The participant’s task was to decide whether
to accept or reject the proposed split. This decision was intended to serve as measure of negative
reciprocity, with the decision to reject representing a decision to engage in negative reciprocity.
Given that this measure is binary, and that the results were highly skewed —to most participants
chose to accept the offer regardless of whether the proposal was fair or unfair— the ultimatum
game has much less power to detect effects (i.e., if any actually existed).
I found that participants’ decisions about whether to accept or reject Player 1’s offer were
again affected by the behavior of Player 1 and by the degree to which the participant adhered to
the norm of negative reciprocity, as measured by the negative reciprocity PNR subscale. Similar
to the findings for positive reciprocity, there wasn’t any interaction between these two variables.
Specifically, participants were more likely to reject an unfair than a fair offer overall, which isn’t
too surprising. What was unexpected was the finding that the more participants adhered to the
norm of negative reciprocity, the more they were to reject the Player 1’s offer, regardless of
whether the offer was fair or unfair. Similar to the findings for positive reciprocity subscale, this
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is unexpected due to the contingent nature of reciprocity. Given there was not an interaction
between the negative reciprocity and partner behavior, this pattern of results suggests that the
negative reciprocity PNR subscale may be measuring some other construct entirely that is more
fixed in nature (e.g., hostility, levels of everyday sadism, etc.). Systematically, exploring the
other traits that could be associated with the tendency to adhere to the norm of negative
reciprocity is another important area for future study.
Additionally, in the ultimatum game, the overwhelming majority (86.71%) of the present
sample choose to accept the Player 1’s offer regardless of the condition. This may have been
because the unfair offer was not unfair enough to register as an instance that calls for the norm of
negative reciprocity to come into play. However, it is important to note that although the rate of
acceptance of proposals in the ultimatum game was high, I did still find that participants were
likely to accept fair offers and to reject unfair offers, even if the latter offer was only marginally
unfair. This aspect of the results are similar to the results reported by Mendoza et al. (2014).
However, the current study did not replicate the interaction between Player 1’s behavior and
group membership found by Mendoza et al (2014), Hypothesis N6. That is, Mendoza et al.
(2014) found that participants were more likely to reject a marginally unfair offer from an
ingroup member than from an outgroup member. Rather, the present study found that
participants were equally likely to reject an unfair offer regardless of whether Player 1 was an
ingroup member on an outgroup member.
One potential reason that accounts for the reason for the high acceptance rates in the
ultimatum game and the higher than average (in comparison to other studies in the trust game)
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may have had something to do with the sample that was used for this study. As mentioned
previously, this study took place at one of the largest Jesuit Catholic universities in America.
Given the Jesuit values of forgiveness, compassion, caring for others, and caring for community,
this sample may have been more religious and/or altruistic than the samples in previous studies. I
speculate that the amount returned to Player 1 in the trust game may have been lower if a
different sample (e.g., non-religious, online, etc.) had been used. Additionally, the point of
“marginally unfair” may have been different for this particular sample than it would be for other
samples for the same reasons. One way to strengthen this aspect of the study would be to first
conduct a pilot test with a sample from the same population using multiple degrees of unfairness
to see where the point of “marginally unfair” lies for this population. There is a need for the
amount to be exactly marginally unfair. Amounts that are not unfair enough are accepted by all,
while amounts that are too unfair are rejected by all, it is only amounts that are precisely
marginally unfair for that particular population that are accepted when coming from an outgroup
member, but rejected when coming from an ingroup member.
Relatedly, given the emphasis on caring for community, the participants may have been
inclined to see fellow students as being more similar to themselves than different, making the
relatively subtle group membership manipulation less likely to be successful. This may have
accounted for the fact no main or interaction effects due to group membership were found for
either the trust game or the ultimatum game. Additionally, students from non-religious
universities and participants from online samples might be somewhat less compassionate and/or
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more likely to assume that they have less in common with one another, which might make the
group induction procedure stronger.
Alternatively, effects due to group membership may not have been found because the
ingroup-outgroup manipulation might not have been strong enough. Although most participants
were able to remember their group membership, they may not have identified strongly enough
with this group in order for it to override the other similarities that they would have had with this
person (e.g., they were both introductory psychology students at the same university and chose to
sign-up for this study). As stated before, one way to strengthen this aspect of the study would
have been to use real groups, and Mendoza et al. (2014) did.
In addition to not having a group membership manipulation that was strong enough,
another potential limitation of this study that would have impacted both the trust and ultimatum
game, may have been that participants and their alleged interaction partners were separated by
time and space. It is difficult to determine the degree to which this aspect of the study may have
impacted the results by looking at the ultimatum game, because of the high acceptance rates.
However, given the low percentage of participants who chose not to return anything in the trust
game, it’s doubtful that many participants were 100% convinced that the other person was not
real. Still, this does not mean that participants were necessarily convinced that the other person
was real, just that they were not confident enough in their disbelief to act accordingly (which
would imply not sharing any money with the other person). Johnson and Mislin’s (2011) metaanalysis of 162 trust game studies found that playing with a simulated partner was associated
with participants in the role of Player 1 contributing nearly .60 standard deviations less of their
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endowment to the general fund than when playing with a real partner. Although this same effect
was not found for people in the position of Player 2, it does suggest that experimenters’ efforts to
deceive participants may not always be successful, and that participants are likely to behave
differently when they are not convinced that another real participant is on the other end of the
interaction. One way to strengthen this aspect of the study would be the change the design, so
that participants believe that they interaction partners for both games are somewhere in the same
room by the use of confederates. Another way to make simulated partners more believable, if
conducting the trust and/or ultimatum game on the computer (either online, on via multiple
networked computers) would be to use software that gives the appearance that the other person is
making decisions in real-time.
In conclusion, the present study examined the effect of mortality salience, group
membership and personal norms of reciprocity on behaviors of reciprocity. I found that decisions
of both negative and positive reciprocity were most influenced by one’s own personal norms of
reciprocity and the behavior of their interaction partner. However, the results indicated that
(unexpectedly) that there was not an interaction between one’s person norm of reciprocity and
partner behavior. Given the contingent nature of reciprocity, this suggest that the PNR may in
fact be measuring some other noncontingent variable(s) (e.g., generalized hostility or
agreeableness). Additionally, I found that there was an effect of mortality salience on reciprocity,
just not in the way that I expected. Specifically, I found that when participants had not been
primed with mortality salience that they were more likely to adhere to the norm of positive
reciprocity. While previous research indicates that mortality salience is associated with the
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adherence to salient norms, it is unclear which norms were prompted for this subset of the
population. Finally, the impact of group membership on decisions of reciprocity remains unclear
because the group manipulation in this study wasn’t strong enough.
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Personal Preferences Survey
Recent research regarding the role of artistic preferences indicates that preferences for one type
of abstract art in comparison to another can reveal important information about a person’s
personality. There are many different personality dimensions. This painting preferences survey
assesses only one of them. This personality characteristic is widely considered to be a stable
and important personality feature that is linked to other highly relevant personal and social
characteristics. Additionally, most people fall squarely into one of two categories of this
dimension. Research indicates that people from opposing categories tend to see the world in
fundamentally different ways and tend to be very different people on many seemingly unrelated
attributes, suggesting that the category that one fits into is related to a basic psychological
difference between people.
For this questionnaire, you will see multiple pairs of painting presented side-by-side. In each
instance, evaluate both paintings, and indicate the painting that you prefer.
In some cases, you may feel that you like both painting. If this occurs, select the painting that
you like the most. Likewise, if you encounter a pair of painting where neither painting appeals to
you, you may still prefer one over the other. Please select the one that you like more. For the
painting that you prefer, type in three words that come to mind when you look at the painting in
the space provided below the presentation of each painting.
Do not spend too much time on each question. Please answer according to your initial reaction.

1. Which painting do you prefer?

a. The painting on the left.
b. The painting on the right.
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2. Which painting do you prefer?

a. The painting on the left.
b. The painting on the right.
3. Which painting do you prefer?

a. The painting on the left.
b. The painting on the right.
4. Which painting do you prefer?

a. The painting on left.
b. The painting on the right.
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5. Which painting do you prefer?

a. The painting on the left.
b. The painting on the right.
6. Which painting do you prefer?

a. The painting on the left.
b. The painting on the right.
7. Which painting do you prefer?

a. The painting on the left.
b. The painting on the right.
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8. Which painting do you prefer?

a. The painting on the left.
b. The painting on the right.
9. Which painting do you prefer?

a. The painting on the left.
b. The painting on the right.
10. Which painting do you prefer?

a. The painting on the left.
b. The painting on the right.
Thank you for completing this pretest questionnaire, further information regarding this
questionnaire will be provided during the completion of the study.
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
Project Title: LUC Personal Preferences Study
Researcher(s): Fatima A. Martin,
Faculty Sponsor: James R. Larson Jr., Ph.D.
Introduction:
You are being asked to take part in a research study being conducted by Fatima A. Martin for a
dissertation under the supervision of Dr. James R. Larson Jr. in the Department of Psychology at
Loyola University of Chicago. An estimated 800 individuals will participate in this study. You
are eligible to participate in this study because you are enrolled in either Psychology 100 or
Psychology 101 and are at least 18 years of age.
Please read this document carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding
whether to participate in the study.
Purpose: The purpose of this research is to learn more about the influence of various personal
preferences on investment decisions.
Procedures:
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked complete a series of tasks:






Complete a 27-item survey.
Complete 2 short essay questions.
Complete another survey.
Read a short reading passage, and answer questions about it.
Complete an investment activity and a decision-making activity.
o You will have a 1 in 10 chance of winning an Amazon gift card the value of the
gift card will depend on the decisions made during the investment and decisionmaking activities.
 The final task will be to complete a final survey.
Completion of the above activities is estimated to be roughly 1 hour.
Risks/Benefits: There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this research beyond
those experienced in everyday life. Additionally, there are no direct benefits to you from
participating in this research. However, the anticipated benefit to society is that we will increase
our knowledge of human behavior, and the knowledge gained by this research will inform
several sub-fields of psychology.
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Compensation:
 If you agree to participate in this research, you will receive two credits that count toward
the fulfillment of the research component of your psychology course. If at any point after
agreeing to participate you decide to withdraw from the study, you are free to do so, and
will not lose that class credit.
 In addition, during the investment activity and the decision-making activity, you will be
asked to make investment related decisions. One out of every ten participants will be
randomly selected to win an AMAZON gift card for the dollar amount the you
earned in either the investment activity or the decision-making activity. Whether you
receive the amount that you earned in the investment activity or the decision-making will
be randomly determined. The maximum possible value of the gift card is $30. If at any
point after agreeing to participate you decide to withdraw from the study, your eligibility
to be randomly selected to win an AMAZON gift card for the dollar amount that you
earned in either the investment activity or the decision-making activity will not be
affected.
Confidentiality:





All of the data obtained in this study are confidential and will be used for research purposes
only. Only aggregate findings will be described in written or oral reports of this research.
All data collected on paper will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in an office in Coffee
Hall. The only individuals who will have access to this information are the principal
investigator, the faculty sponsor, and research assistants who are conducting the experiment.
All electronically stored data will be kept in two password-protected files. Only the listed
researchers will have access to this data.
During the course of this study, you will be asked to provide your e-mail address. Your email address will only be used to provide you with a debriefing statement and an Amazon
gift card, in the event that you win one. The file that contains participants’ e-mail addresses
will be stored separately from response data. Additionally, all identifying information (the
excel file containing participants' email addresses and the paper recording of participants’
email addresses) will be destroyed once the study has concluded and all of the prizes have
been awarded (1 week after the data has been collected). Additionally, the informed consent
forms will be stored separately from the rest of the data and will be kept indefinitely as per
Loyola's policy.

Voluntary Participation: Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to be in
this study, you do not have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to
answer any question or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty. Your
decision to participate or not participate, and/or to withdraw from the study if you later wish to
do so, will not affect your current or future relationship with Loyola University Chicago.
Contacts and Questions: If you have questions about this research project, please feel free to
contact the researcher, F. A. Martin at fmartin1@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor Dr. James R.
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Larson Jr. at jlarson4@luc.edu. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant,
you may contact the Loyola University Office of Research Services at (773) 508-2689.
Statement of Consent: Your signature below indicates that you have read the information
provided above, have had an opportunity to ask questions, and agree to participate in this
research study. The researcher will offer you a copy of this form to keep for your records if you
would like it.
____________________________________________
Participant’s Name
(please print)
____________________________________________ __________________
Participant’s Signature
Date
____________________________________________ ___________________
Researcher’s Signature
Date
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Personal Preferences Survey
Recent research regarding the role of artistic preferences indicates that preferences for one type
of abstract art in comparison to another can reveal important information about a person’s
personality. Although there are many different personality dimensions, this painting preferences
survey assesses only one dimension. This personality characteristic is widely considered to be a
stable and important personality feature that is linked to other highly relevant personal and social
characteristics. Additionally, most people fall squarely into one of two categories of this
dimension. Research indicates that people from opposing categories tend to see the world in
fundamentally different ways and tend to be very different people on many seemingly unrelated
attributes, suggesting that the category that one fits into is related to a basic psychological
difference between people. Because we do not want to call attention to the exact nature of these
two categories right now; for the purpose this study, we have labeled one category that as,
“Colors,” and the other category is labeled “Shapes,”
In the pretest for this study, you completed a questionnaire where you were asked to choose
between pairs of paintings that were displayed side-by-side from one another.
Your pattern of responses indicates that you possess the personality style that is labeled as
“Colors.”
In order to protect your anonymity in the following two activities where you will either be paired
with people who as in your same category, or with people who are in the opposite category, all
participants have been given aliases that correspond to their painting preferences category.
Your alias for the following two tasks will be "Orange."
Others in your group have been given aliases that correspond to different types of colors (e.g.,
“Blue,” “Green,” and “Red”). In contrast, people that possess the personality style that is labeled
as “Shapes,” a have been given aliases that correspond to different types of shapes (e.g.,
“Circle,” “Square,” and “Triangle.”
Hold on to this sheet of paper until you have completed both the investment activity and the
decision-making activity, because you will be asked to indicate your group name and your alias
during these tasks.
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Exit Survey
1. What is your age? _____________
2. What is your race? (Mark only one oval)

 African American / Black
 Asian
 European American / White
 Hispanic/Latino
 Multiracial (please specify) ________________________________________
 Native American / American Indian
 Not listed (please specify) _________________________________________
 Prefer not to respond
3. Gender (Mark only one oval)

 Woman
 Man
 Not listed (please specify) ____________________________
 Prefer not to respond
4. Which personality style group did you belong to?
____________________________________________

5. If you had to guess, what would you say that the purpose of the study was?
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Dear LUC personal preferences study participant,
I am writing to you for two reasons: (a) to thank you for participating in the Loyola University
Chicago personality preferences study, and (b) to provide you with some additional information
about that study.
But first, let me remind you that as part of your compensation for participating in this study you
had an opportunity to win an Amazon gift card. As described when you first did the study, you
were entered into a drawing with 9 other participants, and one of you was randomly selected to
receive a gift card for the amount that you retained at the end of either the investment activity or
the decision-making activity (see below for more details about the investment activity).
Unfortunately, you did not win an Amazon gift card.
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of personal norms of reciprocity, group
membership and thoughts of death on decisions of reciprocity. Previous research suggests that
thoughts of death increase in-group bias (Burke, Martens, Faucher, 2009; Harmon‐Jones,
Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996). Previous research also suggests that in-group bias not
only results in preferential treatment of in-group members, but also increased expectations of
preferential treatment from fellow in-group members, and that individuals are often willing to
punish others who violate these expectations. This phenomenon known as the “Black Sheep
Effect” (Mendoza, Lane, & Amodio, 2014). In addition to these situational factors, previous
research has also found that individual differences in our perception of the social norms of
reciprocity (i.e., our own personal norm of reciprocity) also has a substantial impact on our
interpretation and subsequent behavior when we encounter situations of reciprocity (Perugini,
Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003).
As you may recall, in this study you were asked to complete several tasks. The first of these tasks
was to complete the painting preferences questionnaire. In order to answer research questions
regarding the impact of group membership, we first appeared to assess each participant’s
personal painting preferences and then assigned you to a group based upon the results. However,
the group that you were assigned to was predetermined. Our purpose in using the personal
painting preferences questionnaire was to subtly draw attention to the similarities and differences
among people. Much the same thing might have been accomplished by calling attention to other
characteristics, such as participants’ gender, nationality, or political party affiliation.
Of all the tasks that you completed for this study, the investment activity and the decisionmaking activities were the most important. During the investment activity, in the role of Fund
Manager, and you were tasked with deciding how much of an investment fund to return to an
Investor after that fund had grown in size. Because it was important to standardize the behavior
of the Investors, all of their actions were predetermined. The primary purpose of the investment
activity was to explore the impact of group membership, investor behavior (whether they had
behaved in a way that was generous or ungenerous), and mortality salience on decisions of
positive reciprocity (when one returns a favor). We predicted that participants would return a
smaller portion of the investment fund to ungenerous in-group members due to the “Black Sheep
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Effect,” and that participants who had been asked to write about death for the essay questions
would return even less.
During the decision-making activity, you were assigned to the role of Responder, and you had to
decide whether to accept or reject the offer of an anonymous Proposer. Once again, because it
was important to standardize the behavior of the Proposers, all of their actions were
predetermined. The primary purpose of the decision-making activity was to explore the impact of
group membership, investor behavior (whether they had behaved in a way that was fair or
unfair), mortality salience, and one’s personal norm of negative reciprocity on decisions of
negative reciprocity (when one returns a slight). We predicted that participants would be more
likely to reject an unfair offer from an in-group member in comparison to an unfair outgroup
member. We also predicted that participants would be more likely to reject an unfair offer from
an in-group member if they had been asked to write about death for the essay questions and/or if
they scored high on the personal norm of negative reciprocity subscale.
I’d like to thank you again for your participation. The results of this study will make an
important contribution to the study of reciprocity, groups, social and personal norms, and
mortality salience. If you are interested in learning more about these areas of study, some
references to related articles have been provided below.
References:
-
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Review, 14(2), 155-195.
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mortality salience on intergroup bias between minimal groups. European Journal of
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Mendoza, S. A., Lane, S. P., & Amodio, D. M. (2014). For members only: ingroup
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Personality Science, 5(6), 662-670.
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Thank you,
Fatima Martin
Doctoral Candidate
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fmartin1@luc.edu
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